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ABSTRACT
KNOWLEDGE OF UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 
AFFECTING EDUCATION HELD BY SELECTED 
TENNESSEE PUBLIC SCHOOL PERSONNEL 
by
William P. Abegglen
The purpose of this study was to determine the knowledge o£ United 
States Supreme Court decisions affecting education possessed by public 
school teachers, principals, superintendents, and board members} to 
determine if significant differences existed among these groups in their 
knowledge of Supreme Court decisions affecting education; and to 
determine if significant differences existed within each group depending 
on years of experience in education and level of education.
Five hundred randomly selected subjects from the public school 
systems in Tennessee were asked to indicate their knowledge of Supreme 
Court decisions affecting education by completing the survey instrument, 
Supreme Court Decisions Impacting on Education. This instrument 
measured respondents' knowledge of Supreme Court decisions in five areas: 
(1) student rights; (2) employee rights; (3) church-state relationships; 
(4) race, language, and sex discrimination; and (5) school finance and 
organization. A total of 241 (48.2%) usable responses were returned.
The data revealed that there was a general lack of knowledge of 
Supreme Court decisions affecting education. Significant differences 
were found to exist among the four groups in all areas except that of 
race, language, and sex discrimination.
Superintendents scored significantly higher than teachers and board 
members in knowledge of Supreme Court decisions in the area of student 
rights. Superintendents and principals scored significantly higher than 
teachers in the area of employee rights. Superintendents scored 
significantly higher than all other groups in the area of chur.ch-state 
relationships. In the area of school finance and organization, 
superintendents and principals scored significantly higher than teachers. 
On overall knowledge of Supreme Court decisions affecting education, 
superintendents and principals scored significantly higher than teachers 
and board members.
Years of experience in education was not found to be a significant 
factor within any of the four groups. Level of education was found to be 
a significant factor among superintendents. Superintendents with either 
a doctoral degree or a Master's degree plus additional coursework scored
iii
significantly higher than those with a Master's degree or an Education 
Specialist degree. Level of education was not found to be a significant 
factor within any other group.
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction
Since education is not mentioned in the United States Constitution# 
it is presumed to be a function of the states by virtue of the Tenth 
Amendment. However# educational practices, policies, and procedures must 
conform to the principles stated in the Constitution. To assure this 
conformity the courts have played an increasingly significant role in 
establishing legal principles which serve as guidelines for the daily 
operation of our nation's public schools.
Since 1950 there has been a marked increase in the number of case 
and statutory laws pertaining to the governance of public schools. 
Federal, state, and local governing bodies have all introduced 
legislation on their respective levels to provide guidelines for the 
operation of the schools. It is the responsibility of the courts to 
provide assurances that this legislation is in compliance with the United 
States Constitution.
John C. Hogan (1974) outlines the history of the American court 
system's evolving role in matters pertaining to education. He identified 
five stages of evolution. The first stage was that of judicial 
laissez faire, during which the courts generally ignored education. This 
stage lasted from 1789 until 1850* Hogan identified the second stage as 
that of state control of education. In this period, from 1850 to 1950, 
the state courts claimed that education was exclusively a matter for the 
states. During this stage there was little federal court involvement in
1
matters pertaining to education. The third stage in Hogan's outline was 
the reformation stage, which began in 1950 and continues to the present. 
In this stage the federal court system, and particularly the United 
States Supreme Court, became aware that many of the educational policies 
and practices developed during the second stage were not in compliance 
with federal constitutional requirements. The fourth stage of evolution 
is that of "education under supervision of the courts" which is
concurrent with the reformation stage. Since the federal courts have 
become aware of the many educational policies and practices that 
contradict federal requirements, they have "begun to expand the scope of 
their powers over the schools." In this stage the federal government, 
and especially the United States Supreme Court, has been more assertive 
in its control over educational administration, organization, and 
programs. The fifth stage, the stage of "strict construction," began 
with the landmark decision in school finance, the San Antonio Independent 
School District v. Rodriguez case of 1973. In this decision the Supreme 
Court declared that education is not among the rights guaranteed by our 
federal constitution (pp. 5-14).
Jackson M. Drake stated that from 1789 to 1888 there were only three 
decisions rendered by the United States Supreme Court that resulted in 
any significant changes in the administration of schools. In the sixty 
years that followed (1889 through 1948) there were twenty-two decisions 
handed down that had implications for educational administration. Since 
1949 there has been a substantial increase in the number of Supreme Court 
cases relating to the governance of schools (ERIC ED 168 192).
Statement of the Problem 
The problem of this study was to determine the knowledge of United 
States Supreme Court decisions affecting education possessed by public 
school teachers, principals, superintendents, and board members in 
Tennessee.
Significance of the Study 
The legal principles established by the United States Supreme Court 
should be of interest to all individuals involved in the educational 
enterprise, whether at the instructional, policy-making, or 
policy-implementing level. Because of the ever-increasing number of 
lawsuits being filed against public school teachers, administrators, and 
board members, it is a matter of paramount importance that these 
individuals be knowledgeable in matters relating to school law. If 
teachers, administrators, and board members are to- avoid litigation they 
must be familiar with and implement only those policies and practices 
which are in compliance with the law. Unfortunately, school leaders are 
often not very knowledgeable about legal matters pertaining to 
education (Zirkel, 1978c).
The findings of this study should provide insight into the existing 
state of knowledge of Supreme Court decisions affecting education and 
provide direction for removing some of the deficiencies which may exist. 
The findings might also indicate the need for prescriptive measures to 
be implemented in preservice and in-service programs for public school 
teachers, administrators, and board members.
Research Hypotheses
Given the statement of the problem and the findings from the review 
of related literature* the following hypotheses were formulated:
1. There will be a significant difference among public school
teachers* principals* superintendents* and board members in the amount 
of knowledge demonstrated about United States Supreme Court decisions 
affecting education in the area of student rights and responsibilities.
2. There will be a significant difference among public school
teachers* principals* superintendents* and board members in the amount 
of knowledge demonstrated about United States Supreme Court decisions 
affecting education in the area of employee rights and responsibilities.
3. There will be a significant difference among public school 
teachers* principals* superintendents* and board members in the amount 
of knowledge demonstrated about United States Supreme Court decisions 
affecting education in the area of church and state relationships.
4. There will be a significant difference among public school 
teachers* principals, superintendents, and board members in the amount 
of knowledge demonstrated about United States Supreme Court decisions 
affecting education in the area of race* language, and sex discrimination.
5. There will be a significant difference among public school 
teachers* principals* superintendents* and board members in the amount 
of knowledge demonstrated about United States Supreme Court decisions 
affecting education in the area of school district finance and organization.
€. There will be a significant difference among public school 
teachers* principals* superintendents* and board members in the overall
knowledge demonstrated about United States Supreme Court decisions 
affecting education.
7. There will be a significant difference in the amount of 
knowledge about United States Supreme Court decisions affecting 
education demonstrated by public school teachers with one to five, six 
to ten, eleven to fifteen, sixteen to twenty, and twenty-one or more 
years of experience in education.
8. There will be a significant difference in the amount of 
knowledge about United States Supreme Court decisions affecting 
education demonstrated by public school principals with one to five, six 
to ten, eleven to fifteen, sixteen to twenty, and twenty-one or more 
years of experience in education.
9. There will be a significant difference in the amount of
knowledge about United States Supreme Court decisions affecting 
education demonstrated by public school superintendents with one to five, 
six to ten, eleven to fifteen, sixteen to twenty, and twenty-one or more 
years of experience in education.
10. There will be a significant difference in the amount of
knowledgo about United States Supreme Court decisions affecting 
education demonstrated by public Bchool board members with one to five, 
six to ten, eleven to fifteen, sixteen to twenty, and twenty-one or more 
years of experience in education.
11. There will be a significant difference in the amount of 
knowledge about United States Supreme Court decisions affecting 
education demonstrated by public school teachers with a high school 
diploma, a baccalaureate degree, a Master's degree, a Master's degree
plus additional coursework, an Education Specialist's degree, and a 
doctoral degree.
12. There will be a significant difference in the amount of 
knowledge about United States Supreme Court decisions affecting 
education demonstrated by public school principals with a high school 
diploma, a baccalaureate degree, a Master's degree, a Master's degree 
plus additional coursework, an Education Specialist's degree, and a 
doctoral degree.
13. There will be a significant difference in the amount of 
knowledge about United States Supreme Court decisions affecting 
education demonstrated by public school superintendents with a high 
school diploma, a baccalaureate degree, a Master's degree, a Master's 
degree plus additional coursework, an Education Specialist's degree, 
and a doctoral degree.
14. There will be a significant difference in the amount of 
knowledge about United States Supreme Court decisions affecting 
education demonstrated by public school board members with a high school 
diploma, a baccalaureate degree, a Master's degree, a Master's degree 
plus additional coursework, an Education Specialist's degree, and a 
doctoral degree.
Limitations
The following limitations were imposed on this study:
1. The amount of knowledge of Supreme Court decisions affecting 
education actually possessed by those responding to the survey was 
limited to those cases measured by the Supreme Court Decisions Impacting 
on Education instrument.
2. The participants in the study were limited to randomly selected 
teachers, principals, superintendents, and board members in public school 
systems within the state of Tennessee.
3. The items included in the instrument were limited to United 
States Supreme Court cases and did not deal with decisions handed down 
by lower courts.
4. The items included in the instrument were limited to Supreme 
Court decisions affecting public elementary and secondary schools.
Assumptions
The following assumptions were considered to be pertinent to this 
study:
1. The Supreme Court Decisions Impacting on Education instrument 
(Appendix B) was an instrument which provided an accurate measure of the 
respondents' knowledge of United States Supreme Court decisions affecting 
education.
2. The responses of the public school teachers, principals, 
superintendents, and board members surveyed were based on the respondents' 
true knowledge of landmark Supreme Court decisions affecting education.
3. There was a difference in the levels of knowledge of United 
States Supreme Court decisions affecting education among the different 
groups of respondents.
Definitions of Terms
Parens patriae
The term applied to the sovereign power of the government as 
guardian over incompetent persons, such as minors and the mentally insane.
Literally, the term means "parent of the country."
Per curiam
An opinion concurred in by all the members of the court, but without 
disclosing the name of any particular justice as its author. Literally, 
the term means "by the court."
Public school personnel
In this study the term "public school personnel" is operationally 
defined as including public school teachers, principals, superintendents, 
and board members.
Organization of the Study
Chapter 1 contains the introduction, the statement of the problem, 
the significance of the study, the research hypotheses, the limitations, 
the assumptions, the definitions of terms and the organization of the 
study.
Chapter 2 contains the review of the literature.
Chapter 3 contains a description of the design and procedures used 
in the study.
Chapter 4 contains an analysis of the data gathered in the 
study.
Chapter 5 contains the findings and recomnendations. A brief 
summary of the study is presented.
CHAPTER 2 
Review of the Literature
Introduction
The literature related to the legal aspects of education and the 
impact of the United States Supreme Court in matters relating to 
education is reviewed in this chapter. The first section of the chapter 
includes a review of the literature regarding the need for those 
involved in the educational process to become more knowledgeable of 
their legal rights and responsibilities. Further, this section examines 
the status of teacher education programs with regard to their instruction 
in matters of the law and its impact on educational issues.
Section two presents an examination of the literature with regard to 
the five areas of Supreme Court decisions which impact on educational 
issues. The five areas identified are as follows: (a) student rights
and responsibilities; (b) employee rights and responsibilities; (c) church 
and state relationships; (d) race, language, and sex discrimination; and 
(e) school district finance and organization.
In conducting this review of the literature, a variety of sources, 
including, but not limited to, the following, were used:
1. Educational Resources Information Center.
2. Education journals.
3. Textbooks on educational law.
4. United States Constitution.
5. United States Reports.
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6. Supreme Court Reporter.
7. Federal Supplement.
Education and Law; A Growing Concern 
Since the case of Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka 347 U.S.
4B3 (1954), there has been a marked increase in the number of court 
decisions involving education; and there is no reason to expect that 
judicial and legislative intervention in the educational enterprise will 
diminish in the near future. McCarthy (1976) claimed that since the 
mid-1950’s the
legislatures and courts have reshaped public educational policy.
The increasing public awareness of the role of law in all aspects 
of society and the growing complexity of the educational enterprise 
have catapulted teachers into litigation to an unprecedented degree. 
As this trend shows no signs of diminishing in the near future, 
teachers need to become more intelligent about the legal facets of 
their jobs. (p. 9)
The potential for litigation is a reality with which educators of 
today must be prepared to cope. This potential stems from several 
factors. First, the public has become more litigation-minded. It is 
not at all uncoumon for aggrieved individuals to seek relief in the 
judicial system. Whereas, at.one time in our nation's history, there 
was a reluctance to pursue litigation, that reluctance appears to have 
significantly diminished.
Secondly, the fact that such a large number of individuals are 
involved in the educational process increases the potential for legal
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difficulties. When one considers that nearly 45 million students are 
being taught by approximately 2.5 million teachers who are under the 
direction of 175,000 administrators and supervisors and employed by over 
100,000 school board members, it becomes evident that the possibility for 
a large number of lawsuits exists.
A third factor in the ever-increasing potential for litigation is 
that essentially every educational decision seems to contain a 
legal ingredient. Decisions involving corporal punishment, searching 
students' lockers, dismissing teachers, negotiating teachers' contracts, 
placing nativity scenes on school grounds, and a myriad of other such 
decisions all must be weighed against the legal ingredient.
In discussing the need for educators to be informed about legal 
matters pertinent to education Leipold and Rousch (1964) said, "All 
school persons— school board members, superintendents, principals, 
teachers, janitors, bus drivers, students— are all directly concerned.
Yet the sum total of knowledge of this subject among these groups is 
limited" (p.i).
Nolte (1978) offered three reasons educators need to be informed 
about the legal aspects of teaching. He said that (a) teachers are 
involved in an increasing number of lawsuits, (b) the typical teacher 
preparation program does not adequately provide information about legal 
rights and liabilities, and (c) the court system has dramatically changed 
the teaching profession by virtue of its decisions, especially in 
matters pertaining to students' rights.
Hazard, Freeman, Eisdorfer, and Tractenberg (1977) pointed out that 
in recent decades the judicial and legislative branches have increased
12
their involvement in the schooling process. In describing the 
proliferation of judicial interventions into the field of education 
Hazard et al. (1977) stated that
what once may have been professional decisions now tend to be 
judicial decisions* The traditional judicial reluctance to move 
into the substance and processes of school operations has evolved 
into a more aggressive posture reflecting the courts' concern for 
basic constitutional rights of teachers and pupils, (p. 2)
In the introduction of their book Gatti and Gatti (1972) stated 
that "there are many legal problems with which an educator must deal . . . . 
And there will be more" (p. 9). These two facts of educational life have 
created a growing concern among teacher educators about the need to make 
those pursuing careers in education more knowledgeable of their legal 
rights and responsibilities.
Hazard et al. (1977) noted that the law makes its presence felt at 
every level of the public school enterprise. "Board members, 
administrators, supervisors, teachers, student teachers, and other 
preservice professionals of all kinds work daily in a setting bound by the 
constraints and duties imposed by court rulings, statutory mandates, and 
agency prescriptions" (p. 3). A working knowledge of the parameters of 
these rulings, mandates and prescriptions thus becomes of paramount 
importance to educators who are expected to carry them out.
Hazard et al. (1977) further cautioned:
The traditional notion that schools offered their wares to pupils 
and parents on a take-it-or-leave-it basis is no longer tenable.
The clients of schooling have turned to the law for both a sword
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and a shield. Decisions by school boards, administrators, and 
teachers are challenged by pupils and other school clients. As 
these challenges escalate into lawsuits and legislation, the 
traditional relationships among the parties change. Parents seem 
less willing to accept school decisions about their children; pupils 
are less inclined to accept the school regimen as the gospel. This 
growing skepticism and articulate challenge to school policies and 
practices is healthy; our increasing reliance on the law to "cure" 
educational ailments may not be.
Teachers play a sensitive role in schooling and should be well 
informed about their rights, dutieB, and liabilities and those of 
the pupils. The price of ignorance about the law is frightfully 
high. Aside from the economic cost of school lawsuits, the hostility 
and alienation generated in them interfere with effective schooling. 
As a seedbed for young minds, the schools surely should be one social 
institution in which law, fairness, and equity prevail, (p. 6)
With the increase of legislative and judicial intervention into the 
educational enterprise there have been and will continue to be a number 
of significant changes in educational policy, procedures, and practices. 
Hazard et al. (1977) concluded;
The preparation of professional personnel, the teacher/learner 
relationships, the structures and procedures of schooling are 
increasingly affected by the courts, the legislatures, and 
government agencies at the state and federal levels. Teachers and 
administrators confront the law in their professional roles and 
need to understand the implications and consequences of legal and
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legislative mandates on the pupils and themselves, (p. 56)
Thus, the literature supports the notion that there is growing 
concern that those involved in educating our nation's youth need to 
become more knowledgeable of their legal rights and responsibilities.
As the judicial and legislative branches expand their intervention in the 
schooling process, the awareness and knowledge of legal issues possessed 
by educators need to expand accordingly. Unfortunately, this has not 
been the case. Many writers in the area of school law have expressed 
the belief that the preparation programs for educators are not adequately 
informing teachers of their legal rights, duties, and responsibilities. 
McCarthy (1976) concluded that
there is little justification for institutions of higher education 
to graduate aspiring teachers without offering them some formal 
exposure to legal principles affecting their jobs. Presently 
teachers can even receive advanced degrees from most institutions 
* . . and never take a course in school law. This posture destines 
educators to have reform measures thrust upon them by outside 
forces. Therefore, a crucial need exists to reevaluate teacher 
preparation programs and ensure that they incorporate the legal 
issues that have become an integral part of the teacher's role 
today, (p. 5)
Van Geel (Simpson, 1975) expressed that, while it was not the intent 
of colleges of education to transform education students into lawyers, 
increased exposure to matters of law impacting on the educational process 
could increase educators' awareness of and help them more effectively 
deal with some of the legal issues involved in education. Simpson was
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more forceful in his discussion of the same topic. He claimed that it is 
Ha case of institutional negligence to let any person go out and become a 
teacher or administrator without some fundamental knowledge of law" 
(Simpson, 1975, p. 42).
Hazard et al. (1977) cautioned against the folly of assuming that 
well-intended, professional-minded school personnel will be able to avoid 
litigation. "Their awareness of the legal implications of their work is 
inportant both to their professional role and to the pupils and parents 
they serve" (p. 3).
Following a discussion of the evolution of the intervention of the 
courts into the realm of schools and schooling, Campbell, Cunningham, 
Nystrand, and Usdan (1975) concluded that the courts' involvement in areas 
pertinent to school governance will continue to grow. In light of this 
growing involvement educators need to find more efficient means of 
becoming and remaining knowledgeable of legal implications for education.
In calling for the inclusion of instruction in the area of school 
law in teacher preparation programs. Hazard et al. (1977) emphasized: 
Professional preparation programs generally do not adequately 
inform teachers, administrators, and specialists on matters of 
law; the concentration on pedagogy and academic content overlooks 
the impact of legislation and the legal consequences inpinging on 
the school's mission . . . .  Schools are, indeed, creatures of 
law; and to the extent school professionals are not informed of 
their legal rights, duties, and responsibilities, the schooling 
process is vulnerable to intervention by the courts. Preservice 
preparation of educational personnel must include appropriate
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instruction in significant legal concepts so that the proper 
relations among the law, teachers, pupils, and schooling can be 
respected and turned to the benefit of both producers and 
consumers, (p. 56)
The Supreme Court and Education 
The Constitution of the United States does not specifically address 
the topic of schools or education. Therefore, by virtue of the Tenth 
Amendment, education is generally considered a function of the states. 
"The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor 
prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the States respectively, 
or to the people" (United States Constitution, Amendment Ten). Although 
education is a state function, a state's school code and local school 
policies, procedures, and practices must comply with the constitution.
In those instances in which they do not, the likelihood of litigation 
increases.
Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution of the United States 
established the Supreme Court and provided for the creation of other 
courts by acts of Congress. "The judicial Power of the United States, 
shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the 
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish" (United States 
Constitution, Article III, Section 1).
Generally speaking, the Supreme Court refrains from hearing a case 
unless a substantial federal issue is involved. "The issues in such 
cases touch upon rights guaranteed by the federal constitution or 
affected by federal legislation" (Hazard, 1978, p. 8). Nonetheless, the
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Supreme Court has decided a number of education cases in recent years. 
Reutter (1982) offered a reason for the burgeoning of Supreme Court 
intervention in education matters: "Partly, this has been a reflection
of the post-Wbrld War II accent on civil rights and liberties" (p. 2).
Hazard et al. (1977) noted that federal judicial involvement in 
education is usually based on one of two constitutional principles,
(a) the "general welfare" clause (Article I, section 8 of the 
United States Constitution), which Authorizes congressional action 
on behalf of the people, and (b) the protection of citizens under 
the federal constitution, particularly the First, Fifth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments, (p. 6)
Five areas of Supreme Court decisions affecting education have been 
identified. Below is a brief^examination of the landmark Supreme Court 
decisions in each of these areas. The five areas discussed are:
(a) student rights and responsibilities; (b) employee rights and 
responsibilities; (c) church and state relationships; (d) race, language, 
and sex discrimination; and (e) school district finance and organization.
Student Rights and Responsibilities
Historically, education in the United States has operated under the 
doctrine of in loco parentis. Authority delegated to school officials 
through this doctrine has allowed school officials to make, enforce, and 
interpret the rules of school governance without interference or 
intervention by the courts. Presumably, if school officials acted os a 
reasonable parent would act in a givon situation, then their actions were 
beyond judicial control (Ringenberger, 1901).
Zirkel (1978b) explains the earlier reluctance of the United States 
Supreme Court to interfere in school matters related to the rights and 
responsibilities of students as being "the strong belief of the 
judiciary in the American tradition of local control over the schools"
(p. 32). Even as recently as 1968 the Court stated that "public 
education in our nation is conmitted to the control of state and local 
authorities. Courts do not and cannot intervene in the resolution of 
conflicts which arise in the daily operation of school systems" (Epperson 
V. Arkansas. 393 U.S. 104, 1968).
Since 1943, however, the courts have been giving increased 
attention to the rights of children versus those of state and local 
governments and their agents. .The court system's re-examination of the 
doctrine of in loco parentis led to an emerging interest in protecting 
fundamental rights against government encroachment. Although the 
principle of in loco parentis remains, it has undergone considerable 
transformation in its application in recent years.
The framers of the United States Constitution considered individual 
rights so central that the Constitution had to be amended ten times 
before it could be ratified by the states. These ten amendments, known 
collectively as the Bill of Rights, were intended to protect citizens' 
fundamental liberties from intervention and interference by government 
authorities (Ringenberger, 1981). In the case of In re Gault (1967), 
the United States Supreme Court held that these constitutional guarantees 
applied not only to adults, but to juveniles as well.
Jacobson v. Massachusetts 197 U.S. 11 (1905). Two of the earliest 
United States Supreme Court decisions affecting education in matters 
relating to student rights and responsibilities involved the issue of 
mandatory vaccination. In Jacobson v. Massachusetts (1905), the 
defendant claimed that the Massachusetts statute authorizing local boards 
of health to institute compulsory vaccination programs denied him his 
liberty as secured by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court 
recognized the authority of the state to enact such a statute, referring 
to it as a "police power" of the state. "According to settled 
principles," the United States Supreme Court opinion reads, "the police 
power of a state must be held to embrace, at least, such reasonable 
regulations established directly by legislative enactment as will protect 
the public health and public safety" (JacobBon v. Massachusetts, 25 S.Ct. 
361, 1905). The Supreme Court held that a law mandating compulsory 
vaccination in order to protect the public health and that doeB not 
require the participation of those whose health does not permit such 
vaccination is constitutional. In the words of Mr. Justice Harlan, 
"Whatever may be thought of the expediency of this statute, it cannot be 
affirmed to be, beyond question, in palpable conflict with the 
Constitution" (Jacobson v. Massachusetts. 25 S.Ct. 363, 1905).
Zucht v. King. 260 U.S. 174 (1922). Citing the Jacobson decision as 
precedent, the Court declared, in Zuoht v. King (1922), that it is within 
the police power of a state to enact a statute providing for compulsory 
vaccination. In Zucht. a student challenged a city ordinance that 
provided that no individual could attend a public school or other place
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of education without first having presented a certificate of vaccination. 
It was the student's contention that such an ordinance was a violation of 
the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The Court concluded that such a law is indeed constitutional:
City ordinances making vaccination a condition to attendance at 
public or private schools and vesting broad discretion in health 
authorities to determine when and under what circumstances the 
requirement shall be enforced are consistent with the Fourteenth 
Amendment and, in view of prior decisions, a contrary contention 
presents no substantial constitutional question. (Zucht v. King.
260 U.S. 174, 1922)
Mlnersvllle School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 5fl6 (1940). In 1940 
the United States Supreme Court concluded that a regulation requiring 
students and teachers to salute and pledge allegiance to the American 
flag was constitutional, even if to do so violated an individual's 
religious convictions.
A state regulation requiring that pupils in the public schools, on 
pain of expulsion, participate in a daily ceremony of saluting the 
national flag, whilst reciting in unison a pledge of allegiance to 
it . . . held within the scope of legislative power, and
consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment . . . .  (Minersville School 
District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 1940)
In the Minersville School District v. Gobitis (1940) opinion,
Mr. Justice Frankfurter made two statements which reflect the deference 
that the Court gave to local control of education. First. N . . . the
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courtroom is not the arena for debating issues of educational policy" 
(Minersville School District v. Gobitis. 310 U.S. 586, 1940). And,
It is not our province to choose among competing considerations in 
the subtle process of securing effective loyalty to the traditional 
ideals of democracy, while respecting at the same time individual 
idioayncracies among a people so diversified in racial origins and 
religious allegiances. So to hold would in effect make us the school 
board for the country, (Minersville School District v. Gobitis,
310, U.S. 586, 1940)
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 
(1943). These two remarks are of significance because only three years 
later in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnett (1943), the 
Court reversed its earlier decision, holding that compulsory flag 
salute programs violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
Mr. Justice Jackson delivered the opinion of the court:
We think the action of the local authorities in compelling the flag 
salute and pledge transcends constitutional limitations on their 
power and invades the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is 
the purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve 
from all official control. (West Virginia State Board of Education v. 
Barnette, 319 U.S. 642, 1943)
The protection secured by the First Amendment includes the protection of 
expressions of political opinion and symbolic speech. The refusal to 
participate in a flag salute and pledge program is such an expression 
within the meaning of this Amendment.
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Addressing the question of whether compulsory flag salute and pledge 
programs violate Fourteenth Amendment guarantees Mr. Justice Jackson 
concluded:
The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the States, protects the 
citizens against the State itself and all of its creatures— Boards 
of Education not excepted. These have, of course, important, 
delicate, and highly discretionary functions, but none that they may 
not perform within the limits of the Bill of Rights. (West Virginia 
State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 637, 1943)
The Fourteenth Amendment protects citizens from denial of First 
Amendment rights absent a "present and substantial danger which the state 
may lawfully protect. The mere passive refusal to salute the flag does 
not create a danger to the state such that the First Amendment rights to 
belief and expression may be impaired" (Zirkel, 1978b, p. 37).
Taylor v. Mississippi. 319 U.S. 583 (1943). In a related case,
Taylor v. Mississippi (1943), the Court ruled that the Fourteenth 
Amendment prohibits a state statute that provides for the punishment of 
individuals who, for religious reasons, urge and advise citizens to cease 
saluting national and state flags. Mr. Justice Roberts delivered the 
opinion:
In West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette (1943)
. . . the court has decided that a state may not enforce a regulation 
requiring children in the public schools to salute the national 
emblem. The statute here in question seeks to punish as a criminal 
one who teaches resistance to government compulsion to salute. If
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the Fourteenth Amendment bans enforcement of the school regulation, 
a fortiori it prohibits the imposition of punishment for urging and 
advising that, on religious grounds, citizens refrain from saluting 
the flag. (Taylor v. Mississippi, 319 U.S. 588, 589, 1943)
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). Although not originating in a school 
setting, In re Gault (1967) is regarded as a landmark decision in 
Supreme Court decisions affecting education. The Gault decision is often 
considered the turning point in the Court's interpretation of the 
applicability of constitutional safeguards to minors. The Gault opinion 
clearly recognized that children are "persons” and are entitled to 
protection of constitutional liberties. Mr. Justice Fortas stated that 
"neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults 
alone" (In re Gault, 387 U.S. 13, 1967)•
Because fifteen-year old Gerald Gault was denied procedural due 
process during his juvenile court proceedings, he challenged the 
constitutionality of the state juvenile court statute. In deciding in 
favor of Gault, the Supreme Court determined that, when faced with a 
potential loss of liberty, even a minor is entitled to the procedural 
safeguards afforded by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. If a minor's rights are to be abridged or taken away, he 
must be provided the following constitutional safeguards of due process;
1. A notice of charges.
2. A notice of right to legal counsel.
3. The right of confrontation and cross-examination of complainant.
4. A notice of privilege against self-incrimination.
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5. Access to sworn testimony from complainant and witnesses.
6. Access to a transcript of proceedings.
7. The right of appellate review.
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Coranunity School District. 393 U.S. 
503 (1969). In addition to the protection of procedural due process, the 
Supreme Court has determined that minors also are guaranteed their First 
Amendment right of freedom of speech. In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent 
Community School District (1969). the Court declared it unconstitutional 
to suspend students for the peaceful wearing of arm bands as an expression 
of symbolic speech unless it can be shown that interference with the 
educational process did or would occur. The conduct of the students 
involved in this silent protest of American involvement in Vietnam was 
found to be within the protection of the Free Speech Clause of the First 
Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. "A 
prohibition against expression of opinion, without any evidence that 
the rule is necessary to avoid substantial interference with school 
discipline or the rights of others, is not permissible under the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments" (Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community 
School District. 393 U.S. 503, 1969).
The Court concluded that the students' exercise of their First 
Amendment rights collided with the school authorities' prohibition of 
the wearing of armbands. The Court explained that the mere 
anticipation or apprehension of a disturbance did not supersede the 
students' right of expression. Mr. Justice Fortas, speaking for the 
majority, said:
First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special 
characteristics of the school environment, are available to teachers 
and students. It can hardly be argued that either students or 
teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or 
expression at the schoolhouse gate. (Tinker v. Des Moines Independent 
Coircnunlty School District, 393 U.S. 506, 1969)
The District Court had dismissed the complaint in the Tinker case, 
upholding "the constitutionality of the school authorities' action on the 
ground that it was reasonable in order to prevent disturbance of school 
discipline" (Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Cornnunity School District, 
393 U.S. 505, 1969). The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's 
decision. Thus, the United States Supreme Court overruled the two lower 
decisions. Mr. Justice Black, in his dissenting remarks, concluded:
I wish, therefore, wholly to disclaim any purpose on my part to hold 
that the Federal Constitution compels the teachers, parents, and 
elected school officials to surrender control of the American public 
school system to public school students. I dissent. (Tinker v .
Des Moines Independent Comwunitv School District. 393 U.S. 526, 1969)
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975). The Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution requires that no person shall be deprived of 
life, liberty, or property without due process of law. In recent years 
the Court has attempted to ascertain whether these due process procedures 
were applicable to the education environment. The judgment rendered in 
Goss v. Lopez (1975) was that suspensions ordered and statutes permitting 
suspensions, absent provisions for notice and a hearing, are
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unconstitutional. By a five-to-four margin the Supreme Court ruled that 
students facing suspensions of ten days or less have "property" and 
"liberty" interests that qualify for protection under the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Although there is no provision in the United States Constitution 
for free public education, the fact that a state has undertaken to 
provide its children with such an education creates a constitutionally 
protected property interest. Since education is a constitutionally 
protected property interest, a student's education cannot be denied 
because of misconduct without adherence to the minimum procedures 
required by due process. Speaking for the majority Mr. Justice White 
wrote:
The authority possessed by the State to prescribe and enforce 
standards of conduct in its schools although concededly very 
broad, must be exercised consistently with constitutional safeguards. 
Among other things, the State is constrained to recognize a student's 
legitimate entitlement to a public education as a property interest 
which is protected by the Due Process Clause and which may not be 
taken away for misconduct without adherence to the minimum procedures 
required by that Clause. {Goss v. Lopez. 419 U.S. 574, 1975)
The Due Process Clause's prohibition against arbitrary deprivation 
of a liberty interest is applicable in the Goss case, too. The Supreme 
Court concluded that students have a "liberty" interest in their 
reputation as well as their future educational and employment 
opportunities. "The State's claimed right to determine unilaterally and 
without process whether that misconduct has occurred immediately collides
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with the Due Process Clause's prohibition against arbitrary deprivation 
of liberty" tGos3 v. Lopez. 419 U.S. 565/ 1975). "Where a person's good 
namer reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the 
government is doing to him, the minimal requirements of the Clause must 
be satisfied" tGoss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 574, 1975).
The Court emphasized that they thought that in school suspensions 
only minimal procedures of due process were required. They stopped short 
of requiring school authorities to afford students the opportunity to 
secure counsel, to confront and cross-examine complainants, or to call 
witnesses on their own behalf (Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 583, 1975). The 
Court held that students to be suspended for up to ten days must be 
accorded the following due process procedures prior to the suspension:
(1) oral or written notice of the charges; (2) an explanation of the 
evidence the authorities have; and (3) a hearing, at which time the 
student is allowed to present his or her version of the misconduct in 
question.
There need be no delay between the time "notice" is given and the 
time of the hearing. In the great majority of cases the 
disciplinarian may informally discuss the alleged misconduct with 
the student minutes after it has occurred. We hold only that, in 
being given an opportunity to explain his version of the facts at 
this discussion, the student first be told what he is accused of 
doing and what the basis of the accusation is. (Goss v. Lopez, 419 
U.S. 582, 1975)
The decision of the Court in Goss further provided that if a 
student's continued presence at the school endangers persons, or property.
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or threatens to disrupt the academic process, suspension could precede 
the required procedures. If immediate removal from the school is 
necessary, the notice and hearing should follow within a reasonable 
time.
Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975). Since 1871 individuals 
who contend that their civil rights have been violated by an agent of 
the state have had a right to seek redress in the judicial system under 
a statute known as Section 1983. Over a century later, in Wood v. 
Strickland (1975), the Supreme Court addressed the question of personal 
liability of school administrators and school board members for violation 
of students' rights in a case involving the expulsion of three students 
for "spiking" the punch at an extracurricular meeting held at the school.
On the basis of common-1aw tradition and public policy, the Court 
held that school officials are entitled to qualified immunity from 
liability for damages under Section 1983. This qualified immunity is 
dependent upon two elements of good faith. First, to retain inmunity 
from liability, school officials must act without "the malicious intention 
to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury to the 
student" (Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 322, 1975). Secondly, a school 
official is "not immune from liability for damages under Section 1983 if 
he knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took within his 
sphere of official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights 
of the student affected . . (Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 322, 1975). 
Any action "with such an impermissible motivation or with such disregard 
of the student's clearly established constitutional rights . . . cannot
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reasonably be characterized as being in good faith" (Wood v. Strickland. 
420 U.S. 322, 1975) and hence is denied immunity. If school officials 
violate a student's constitutional rights, whether through ignorance or 
through disregard for the law, they forfeit their immunity and are liable.
Mr. Justice White, writing the majority opinion, stated the need for 
granting this qualified immunity;
We think there must be a degree of immunity if the work of the 
schools is to go forward; and however worded, the immunity must be 
such that public school officials understand that action taken in 
the good-faith fulfillment of their responsibilities and within the 
bounds of reason under all the circumstances will not be punished 
and that they need not exercise their discretion with undue timidity. 
(Wood v. Strickland. 420 U.S. 321, 1975)
To deny any measure of immunity to school officials would have subjected 
the decision-making process to intimidation.
Baker V. Owen. 39S F. Supp. 294 (1975). In recent years, courts at 
various levels have been called upon to consider the constitutionality of 
statutes empowering school officials to employ corporal punishment. In 
Baker v. Owen (1975), respondents claimed that a Worth Carolina statute 
empowering school authorities to “use reasonable force in the exercise of 
lawful authority to restrain or correct pupils and to maintain order" 
(Worth Carolina; General Statutes Sections 115-146) was unconstitutional 
on two counts. It was argued that the administration of corporal 
punishment violated a student's Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest
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(discussed above under Goss v. Lopez) and his or her Eighth Amendment 
protection from cruel and unusual punishment.
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the District 
Court, upholding the use of corporal punishment in the schools. The 
District Court claimed that although there is a Fourteenth Amendment 
liberty interest in parents' control of their children, the state has a 
countervailing interest in maintaining order in the schools, including 
the freedom to use corporal punishment as a means of maintaining that 
order. However, because of that Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest, 
in administering corporal punishment school officials must accord students 
with minimal due process procedures. These procedures include the 
following protections:
(1) Except for those acts of misconduct which are so antisocial or 
disruptive in nature as to shock the conscience, corporal punishment 
may never be used unless student is informed beforehand that specific 
misbehavior will occasion its use and, subject to some exception, it 
should never be employed as first line of punishment for misbehavior, 
but should be used only after attempt has been made to modify behavior 
by some other means. (Baker v. Owen. 395 F. Supp. 295, 1975)
(2) “Teacher or principal must punish corporally in presence of second 
school official, who must be informed beforehand and in student's presence 
of reason for punishment . . . "  (Baker v. Owen, 395 F. Supp. 295, 1975).
(3) “School official who has administered corporal punishment to student 
must provide child's parent, upon request, written explanation of his 
reasons and name of second official who was present” (Baker v. Owen, 395 
F. Supp. 295, 1975).
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The District Court held that the administration of corporal 
punishment to the student in question in this case did not constitute 
cruel and unusual punishment. Therefore, the respondents1 claim that the 
student's Eighth Amendment rights were violated was denied.
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977). In the emotionally-charged 
case of Ingraham v. Wright (1977), two Florida junior high school students 
alleged that they and other students had been subjected to corporal 
punishment in violation of their constitutional rights. Two questions 
concerning the use of corporal punishment in public schools were presented: 
(1) Does the implementation of corporal punishment, as a means of 
maintaining discipline in the schools, constitute cruel and unusual 
punishment as prohibited by the Eighth Amendment? and, (2) Does the 
practice of corporally punishing students require prior notice and hearing 
to comply with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Even though the evidence showed that the paddlings given to the two 
students were exceptionally harsh, the Supreme Court concluded that the 
Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual punishment clause i*3 inapplicable to 
disciplinary corporal punishment in schools.' The opinion of the Court, 
written by Mr. Justice Powell stated:
An examination of the history of the (Eighth) Amendment and the 
decisions of this Court construing the proscription against cruel 
and unusual punishment confirms that it was designed to protect those 
convicted of crimes. He adhere to this long-standing limitation 
and hold that the Eighth Amendment does not apply to the paddling of
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children ab a means of maintaining discipline in public schools. 
(Ingraham v. Wright. 430 U.S. 664, 1977)
In their examination of the question regarding the applicability of 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court held that 
that clause does not require notice and hearing prior to inflicting 
corporal punishment. Minimal due process procedures were determined to 
be sufficient safeguards. While recognizing that corporal punishment in 
the public schools does involve a student's liberty interest, the Court 
concluded that "the Due Process Clause does not require notice and a 
hearing prior.to the imposition of corporal punishment in the public 
schools, as that practice is authorized and limited by the common law" 
(Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 682, 1977).
While denying the applicability of the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments in this case, the Court pointed out that students are 
protected against excessive or unjustified corporal punishment by the 
opportunity to file civil or criminal complaints against school officials. 
"To the extent that the force is excessive or unreasonable, the educator 
in virtually all States is subject to possible civil and criminal 
liability" (Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 661, 1977).
In those cases where severe punishment is contemplated, the 
available civil and criminal sanctions for abuse . . . afford 
significant protection against unjustified corporal punishment. 
Teachers and school authorities are unlikely to inflict corporal 
punishment unnecessarily or excessively when a possible consequence 
of doing so is the institution of civil or criminal proceedings 
against them. (Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 678, 1977)
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Mr. Justice White delivered the opinion of the four dissenting 
justices in Ingraham v. Wright (1977), and argued that the Eighth 
Amendment should apply to students because to mile otherwise is to afford 
criminals greater constitutional safeguards than those granted to 
misbehaving juveniles. If a criminal were to receive the punishment 
inflicted on the two junior high students in question in this case there
is little doubt that the Eighth Amendment would have been deemed
applicable. Mr. Justice White offered the following observations 
regarding the majority's opinion:
By holding that the Eighth Amendment protects only criminals, the
majority adopts the view that one is entitled to the protections
afforded by the Eighth Amendment only if he is punished for acts 
that are sufficiently opprobrious for society to make them "criminal". 
(Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 691, 1977)
In response to the opinion of the majority that students were 
adequately protected against excessive corporal punishment or denial of 
due process because they have opportunity to pursue civil and criminal 
action against school authorities, Mr. Justice White said:
The majority's conclusion that a damages remedy for excessive 
corporal punishment affords adequate process rests on the novel 
theory that the State may punish an individual without giving him 
an opportunity to present his side of the story, as long as he can 
later recover damages from a state official if he is innocent. 
(Ingraham v. Wright. 430 U.S. 696, 1977)
34
Employee Rights and Responsibilities
Like all other citizens, school employees receive the protections 
granted by the United States Constitution. Of particular significance 
are the individual rights protected by the first ten amendments to the 
Constitution. Teachers, like students, do not shed their constitutional 
rights at the schoolhouse gate.
Although all United States citizens are guaranteed certain rights, 
these rights are seldom viewed by the courts as absolutes. In any 
consideration of constitutional rights a proper “balance" is sought.
Zirkel (1978b) savs that the Supreme Court "will continue to wrestle 
with the balance between the employee's individual right and the 
interest of the educational establishment as represented through the 
state" (p. 48). In cases involving employee rights,
whether the rights of a teacher will be held to be constitutionally 
protected will depend in part on the weight given the teacher's 
expressed right, as against the reasonableness of state action needed 
to operate and manage the schools efficiently and effectively. 
(Zirkel, 1978b, p. 47)
Hoite (1978) stated that the student's right to learn is broader and 
deeper than the teacher’s right to teach.
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). In Meyer v. Nebraska (1923), 
the Supreme Court ruled that a state law which prohibited the teaching of 
a modern foreign language to a student who had not yet completed the 
eighth grade was unconstitutional. The Court determined that such an 
action by the state was an invasion of the guarantees of the Fourteenth
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Amendment. The Fourteenth Amendment protects individuals from arbitrary 
or unreasonable state action impairing life, liberty, or property 
interests.
In overturning the decision of the Supreme Court of ttie State of 
Nebraska, the United States Supreme Court ruled that such a law prohibiting 
the teaching of a foreign language to students in kindergarten through 
eighth grade exceeded the power of the state. The Court held that
the right to choose and pursue a given legitimate vocation is within 
the rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment . . . .  Inparting 
knowledge in a foreign language is not inherently imnoral or inimical 
to the public welfare, and not a legitimate subject for prohibitory 
legislation. (Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 391, 1923)
Mr. Justice McReynolds delivered the opinion of the Court and 
concluded:
The desire of the legislature to foster a homogeneous people with 
American ideals prepared readily to understand current discussions 
of civic matters is easy to appreciate . . . .  But the means adopted, 
we think, exceed the limitations upon the power of the State and 
conflict with rights assured to plaintiff in error. (Meyer v.
Nebraska. 262 U.S. 402, 1923)
Adler v. Board of Education of the City of New York. 342 U.S. 485 
(1952). The question of the constitutionality of loyalty oaths has been 
the subject of extensive review by the Court. More than a dozen loyalty 
oath decisions were handed down by the Supreme Court in the twenty years 
between 1952 and 1971.
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The Court . . . has formulated a doctrine that will strike down as 
unconstitutional for vagueness any loyalty oath which is unclear 
and/or difficult for an employee to determine what conduct is covered 
by the law and what may be regarded as violative of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. (Zirkel, 1978b, pp. 47-48)
One of the earliest loyalty oath decisions was Adler v. Board of 
Education of the City of New York (1952). In this case, the Court upheld
the constitutionality of the Hew York City Civil Service statute in
question. The statute made "ineligible for employment in any public 
school any member of any organization advocating the overthrow of the 
Government by force, violence or unlawful means" (Adler v. Board of 
Education of the City of New York, 342 U.S. 485, 1952). The law further 
required the Board of Regents
(1) to adopt and enforce rules for the removal of any employee who 
violates or is ineligible . . .  (2) to promulgate a list of 
(proscribed) organizations . . . and (3) to provide in Its rules 
that membership in any organization so listed is prima facie evidence 
of disqualification for employment in the public schools. No
organization may be so listed, and no person severed from or denied
employment, except after a hearing and subject to judicial review. 
(Adler v. Board of Education of the City of New York, 342 U.S. 485, 
1952)
Because of the specific provisions of the New York City Civil Service 
statute, the Court decreed that the void-for-vagueness policy need not be 
applied in this case. Because the law penalized only knowing membership
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and because it provided £or a hearing prior to disqualification, it was 
found to be within the bounds of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process 
Clause.
Wleman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952). The Adler decision was the 
exception rather than the rule, for-in most other cases the Supreme Court 
ruled loyalty oaths unconstitutional. In Wleman v. Updegraff (1952), the 
Supreme Court declared an Oklahoma state employees' loyalty oath 
unconstitutional because it conditioned state employment on the taking of 
a loyalty oath based on innocent, as well as knowing, membership in a 
subversive organization. The Oklahoma loyalty oath excluded individuals 
from state employment "solely on the basis of membership in such 
organizations, regardless of their knowledge concerning the activities 
and purposes of the organizations to which they had belonged" (Wleman v. 
Updegraff, 344 U.S. 1B3, 1952).
The Court's decision in Wleman was based on the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
To be valid under this clause, a statute must require that those to 
be penalized have actual knowledge of which organizations are banned 
and of the actual proscribed purpose of any organization to which 
they may belong . . . .  The Court assumes that the oath penalizes 
innocent as well as knowing membership . . . .  The Court also finds 
the statute to be an impermissible interference with the First 
Amendment freedom of association. (Zirkel, 1978b, p. 53)
Shelton v. Tucker. 364 U.S. 479 (1960). An Arkansas law required 
each teacher in state-supported schools to file an annual affidavit
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listing every organization to which he or she had belonged or regularly 
contributed within the preceding five years. Teachers in the state- 
supported schools had no tenure and were not covered by a civil service 
system. The statute thus required Arkansas teachers to disclose 
information to those who could fire them at the end of any given school 
year, without notice of the reasons for dismissal or an opportunity for 
a hearing prior to dismissal. The Supreme Court ruled that the Arkansas 
statute was invalid because it deprived teachers of their right of 
associational freedom.
While not denying that the state of Arkansas has a right to 
investigate the fitness and competence of its teachers, the broad sweep 
of this statute interfered with associations that have no bearing on 
teacher fitness, went far beyond what might be a legitimate inquiry, 
and unconstitutionally inpaired the teachers1 right of freedom of 
association. "This First Amendment right of freedom of association is 
protected from unnecessary or overbroad state interference by the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment" (Zirkel, 1978b, p. 56).
Cranp v. Board of Public Instruction of Orange County, 368 U.S.
278 (1961). A Florida statute required every employee of the state and 
its subdivisions to swear in writing that he had never lent his "aid, 
support, advice, counsel, or influence to the Communist Party." The 
statute further required the immediate discharge of any employee who 
failed to subscribe to such an oath. A teacher refused to sign the 
statement and challenged the statute, claiming that its meaning was so 
vague as to deprive him of liberty or property without due process of law.
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In overturning the decision of the Florida Supreme Court, the 
United States Supreme Court declared the statute unconstitutional.
The meaning of the required oath is so vague and uncertain that the 
State cannot, consistently with the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, force an employee to take such an oath, at the 
risk of subsequent prosecution for perjury, or face immediate 
dismissal from public service. (Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction 
of Prance County, 368 U.S. 278, 1961)
Mr. Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of the Courtt 
We think that this case demonstrably falls within the compass of 
those decisions of the Court which hold that 11 . . .  a statute which 
either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that 
men of conmon intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and 
differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due 
process of law" . . . .  The vice of unconstitutional vagueness is 
further aggravated where, as here, the statute in question operates 
to Inhibit the exercise of individual freedoms affirmatively 
protected by the Constitution. (Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction 
of Orange County, 368 U.S. 287, 1961)
Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964). This class action, brought 
by members of the faculty, staff, and student body of the University of 
Washington, sought judgment on the constitutionality of two state statutes 
requiring the taking of oaths as a condition of employment by the state.
A 1931 statute required teachers to swear, by precept and example, to 
promote respect for the flag and the institutions of the United States and
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the State of Washington, reverence for law and order, and undivided 
allegiance to the Government of the United States. A 1955 statute 
required each state employee to swear that he or she was not a
subversive person: that he does not commit, or advise, teach, abet,
or advocate another to commit or aid in the commission of any act 
intended to overthrow or alter, or assist in the overthrow or 
alteration, of the constitutional form of government by revolution, 
force, or violence. (Baggett v. Bullitt. 377 U.S. 360, 1964)
Citing the Cramp decision, the Court held that the provisions of the 
two statutes violated due process since the oaths were unduly vague, 
uncertain, and broad.
A State cannot require an employee to take an unduly vague oath 
containing a promise of future conduct at the risk of prosecution 
for perjury or loss of employment, particularly where the exercise 
of First Amendment freedoms may thereby be deterred. (Baggett v . 
Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 1964)
Elfbrandt v. Russell, 364 U.S. 11 (1966). An Arizona act required 
state employees to take an oath to support the Federal and State 
Constitutions and state laws. Under a legislative gloss put on the oath, 
an employee was subject to prosecution for perjury and discharge from 
office if he "knowingly and willfully" became or remained a member of the 
communist party of the United States or its successors or any of its 
subordinate organizations or any other organization having as one of its 
purposes the overthrow of the government. This Arizona act was challenged 
by a teacher who refused to take the oath claiming that the meaning of the
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oath was unclear and that she could not obtain a hearing In order to have 
the meaning determined.
The Supreme Court, In a five-to-four decision, overturned the 
decision of the Arizona Supreme Court and declared that a loyalty oath 
statute which attaches sanctions to membership without requiring the 
"specific intent" to further the illegal aims of the organization is 
unconstitutional.
The Court held that political groups may embrace both legal and 
illegal aims, and persons may join such groups without embracing the 
organization's illegal aims.
Those who join an organization but do not participate in its 
unlawful activities surely pose no threat, either as citizens or 
as public employees. Laws such as this which are not restricted 
in scope to those who join with the "specific intent" to further 
illegal action impose, in effect, a conclusive presumption that the 
member shares the unlawful aims of the organization. (Elfbrandt v . 
Russell, 384 U.S. 17, 1966)
The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that a 
statute infringing on protected constitutional rights, in this case 
freedom of political association, be narrowly drawn to define and 
punish specific conduct constituting a clear and present danger to 
a substantial interest of the state. Those who join an organization 
without sharing in its unlawful purpose pose no threat to 
constitutional government. (Zirkel, 1978b, p. 58)
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Keylshian v. Board of Regents of the University of the State of 
Hew York, 385 U.S. 589 (19671. New York had a complicated network of 
teacher loyalty laws and regulations. The constitutionality of this 
network of laws was challenged by a number of faculty members and one 
nonfaculty employee of the State University of New York. The laws under 
examination provided for the dismissal of employees of the state 
educational system who uttered "treasonable or seditious" words, who 
performed "treasonable or seditious" acts, who advocated or participated 
in the distribution of written materials supporting violent overthrow of 
the government, and who belonged to "subversive" organizations.
The Court, by a five-to-four margin, declared that loyalty oath 
statutes which make membership in an organization sufficient grounds 
for termination are unconstitutional. To be valid, a loyalty law must 
be limited to knowing, active members who help to pursue the illegal 
goals of the subversive organization. Mr. Justice Brennan, in delivering 
the majority opinion, stated that a "crucial consideration is that no 
teacher can know just where the line is drawn between 'seditious' and 
nonseditious utterances and acts" (Kevishian v. Board of Regents of the 
University of the State of Hew York, 385 U.S. 599, 1967).
In his argument that the loyalty laws were unduly vague and broad, 
Mr. Justice Brennan further claimed that other provisions of the statutes 
suffer from vagueness. For example, the provision which bars employment 
of any person who "by word of mouth or writing wilfully and deliberately 
advocates, advises, or teaches the doctrine" of forceful overthrow of 
government is "plainly susceptible of sweeping and improper application. 
It may well prohibit the employment of one who merely advocates the
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doctrine in the abstract without any attempt to indoctrinate others, 
or incite others to action in furtherance of unlawful aims" (Keyishian v. 
Board of Regents of the University of the State of Mew York, 385 U.S. 
599-600, 1967).
Another subsection of the Hew York statute required the dismissal of 
an employee who was involved with the distribution of written material 
"containing or advocating, advising or teaching the doctrine" of forceful 
overthrow, and who himself “advocates, advises, teaches, or embraces the 
duty, necessity, or propriety of adopting the doctrine." Here again, mere 
advocacy of abstract doctrine is apparently included.
In declaring the various laws unconstitutional, the Court concluded 
that where "statutes have an overbroad sweep, just sb where they are 
vague, the hazard of loss or substantial impairment of those precious 
rights may be critical . . . "  (Keyishian v. Board of Regents of the 
University of the State of Hew York, 385 U.S. 609, 1967). The opinion 
of the Court was based on the First Amendment freedoms of speech and 
association and the safeguard of due process of law as guaranteed by 
the Fourteenth Amendment.
Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 207 (1971). A Florida teacher 
m s  dismissed for her refusal to sign a loyalty oath which stated:
I do hereby solemnly swear that 1 will support the Constitution of 
the United States and of the State of Florida; and that 1 do not 
believe in the overthrow of the Government of the United States or 
of the State of Florida by force or violence.
The dismissed teacher challenged the constitutionality of both clauses of 
the oath.
The Court determined that a loyalty oath conditioning public 
employment on the employee's affirmation to BUpport the federal and state 
Constitutions is constitutionally valid. However, that portion of the 
oath requiring the employee to swear that he does not believe in the 
violent overthrow of the federal or state governments is unconstitutional 
where it provides for dismissal without a hearing. "The second portion 
of the oath . . . fallB within the ambit of decisions of this Court 
proscribing summary dismissal from public enployment without hearing or 
inquiry required by due process . . . .  That portion of the oath, 
therefore, cannot stand" (Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 208-209,
1971). Thus, the statutes' provision for dismissal without a hearing 
offends the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In Cole v. Richardson (1972), Mr. Chief Justice Burger reviewed the 
Court's path through the loyalty oath maze:
He have made clear that neither federal nor state government may 
condition employment on taking oaths that impinge on rights 
guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments respectively, as 
for example those relating to political beliefs . . . .  Nor may 
employment be conditioned on an oath that one has not engaged, or 
will not engage, in protected speech activities such as the following: 
criticizing institutions .of government; discussing political doctrine 
that approves the overthrow of certain forms of government; and 
supporting candidates for political office . . . .  Enployment may 
not be conditioned on an oath denying past, or abjuring future, 
associational activities within constitutional protection;- such 
protected activities include membership in organizations having
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illegal purposes unless one knows of the purpose and shares a 
specific intent to promote the illegal purpose . . . .  And, finally, 
an oath may not be so vague that "men of common intelligence must 
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, 
^because such an oathj violates the first essential of due process 
of law . . . Concern for vagueneBS in the oath cases has been 
especially great because uncertainty as to an oath's meaning may 
deter individuals from engaging in constitutionally protected 
activity conceivably within the scope of the oath. (Cole v. 
Richardson, 405 U:S. 680-681, 1972)
Slochower V. Board of Higher Education of New York City, 350 O.S.
551 (1956). Two similar cases with seemingly conflicting decisions 
illustrate the delicacy with which the United States Supreme Court makes 
its determinations. Section 903 of the New York City Charter provided 
that a city employee who utilized the Fifth Amendment against self­
incrimination to avoid answering, before a legislative committee, a 
question related to his official conduct, can be discharged from his job.
A professor in a college operated by the city was released, without 
notice or hearing, because he refused to answer questions concerning his 
membership in the Communist Party. Under New York law, the teacher was 
entitled to tenure and could be dismissed only for cause and after notice, 
hearing, and opportunity for appeal. Since the local board already 
possessed the information requested by the legislative committee, “ it 
cannot be claimed that the Board's action in dismissing the teacher was 
part of a bona fide attempt to gain needed and relevant information
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regarding his qualifications for his position" (Slochower v. Board of 
Higher Education of New York City, 350 U.S. 551# 1956). The Court thus 
held that the board's action in dismissing a teacher because of his 
refusal to answer questions irrelevant to an inquiry into his fitness to 
teach and without a hearing was unconstitutional.
Bellan v. Board of Public Education. School District of Philadelphia. 
357 U.S. 399 (1958). In Beilan v. Board of Public Education (1958), a 
similar circumstance eventuated in a different decision from the Court. 
Beilan, a Philadelphia public school teacher, refused to answer his 
superintendent's questions relating to his Coiranunistic affiliations and 
activities. The teacher refused to answer even after being warned that 
the inquiry related to his fitness to teach and that refusal to answer 
might lead to his dismissal. After a hearing, the Board of Education 
found that Beilan's refusal to answer the superintendent's questions 
constituted "incompetency", grounds for discharge under the state tenure 
law, and discharged him. The teacher claimed that the board's action 
was unconstitutional.
The Court held that in this case the board of education's discharge 
of a teacher for failure to answer his superintendent's inquiry concerning 
his fitness to teach was constitutional.
The questions petitioner (Beilan) refused to answer were relevant to 
his fitness and suitability as a teacher, and his discharge was based 
upon his insubordination and lack of frankness and candor in refusing 
to answer such questions— not upon disloyalty or any of the activities 
inquired about . . . .  The State Supreme Court held that
"incompetency," within the meaning of the relevant state statute, 
includes petitioner's "deliberate and insubordinate refusal to 
answer the questions of his administrative superior in a vitally 
important matter pertaining to his fitness," and this interpretation 
is not inconsistent with the Federal Constitution. (Beilan v. Board 
of Public Education. School District of Philadelphia, 357 U.S. 
399-400, 1958)
The essential difference between the Slochower decision and the 
Beilan decision was the nature of the inquiry. In Slochower’s case the 
questions were not viewed by the Court as related to his fitness to teach; 
in Beilan*s case the questioning superintendent explicitly and 
consistently warned the teacher that his inquiry was to determine Beilan*s 
fitness to teach.
Pickerino v. Board of Education of Township High School District 205. 
Will County, 391 U.S. 563 (1968). The board of education dismissed a 
teacher for writing and publishing in a newspaper a letter criticizing the 
board's allocation of school funds between educational and athletic 
programs and the board's methods of informing, or preventing the informing 
of, the school district's taxpayers of the real reasons additional tax 
revenues were being sought. At a hearing, the board charged that 
numerous statements in the letter were false and that publication of the 
letter was "detrimental to the efficient operation and administration of 
the schools of the district" and that "the interests of the school 
required" Pickering's dismissal. The dismissed teacher claimed that the 
letter was protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
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The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Illinois courts and 
ruled that the teacher's dismissal was inproper. The Court held that 
absent proof of false statements knowingly or recklessly made by 
him/her, a teacher's exercise of his/her right to speak on issues 
of public importance, e.g., on the raising and disbursement of 
funds for education, may not be the basis of his/her dismissal 
from public enployment. (zirkel, 1978b, p. 60)
The teacher's First Amendment right to freedom of expression was 
balanced against the State's interest in promoting the efficiency of 
its public schools. Mr. Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the 
Court:
The public interest in having free and unhindered debate on matters 
of public importance— the core value of the Free Speech Clause of 
the First Amendment— is so great that it has been held that a 
State cannot authorize the recovery of damages by a public official 
for defamatory statements directed at him except when such statements 
are shown to have been made either with knowledge of their falsity 
or with reckless disregard for their truth or falsity. (Pickering 
v. Board of Education of TownBhip High School District 205, Will 
County. 391 U.S. 573, 1968)
In sum, we hold that, in a case such as this, absent proof of false 
statements knowingly or recklessly made by him, a teacher's 
exercise of his right to speak on issues of public importance may 
not furnish the basis for his dismissal from public employment. 
(Pickering v. Board of Education of Township High School District 205. 
Mill County. 391 U.S. 574, 1968)
Those statements of appellant's which were substantially correct 
regarded matters of public concern and presented no questions of 
faculty discipline or harmony; hence those statements afforded no 
proper basis for the Board's action in dismissing appellant . . . .  
Appellant's statements which were false likewise concerned issues 
then currently the subject of public attention and were neither 
shown nor could be presumed to have interfered with appellant's 
performance of his teaching duties or the school's general 
operation. They were thus entitled to the same protection as if 
they had been made by a member of the general public, and, absent 
proof that those false statements were knowingly or recklessly made, 
did not justify the Board in dismissing appellant from public 
employment. (Pickering v. Board of Education of Township High School 
District 205, Will County, 391 U.S. 563-564, 1968)
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968). A 1926 Arkansas statute 
prohibited teachers in any state-supported school to teach or use a 
textbook that teaches the Darwinian theory of evolution. In this case, 
a Little Rock high school teacher sought declaratory and injunctive relief 
challenging the constitutionality of the Arkansas "anti-evolution" 
statute.
The Court concluded that a law prohibiting the Darwinian theory of
t
evolution was unconstitutional, conflicting with the Establishment Clause 
of the First Amendment. " . . .  the law must be stricken," wrote 
Mr. Justice Fortas, "because of its conflict with the constitutional 
prohibition of state laws respecting an establishment of religion or
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prohibiting the free exercise thereof" (Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 
103, 1968).
The Court also stated that a state's right to prescribe the public 
school curriculum did not include the right to prohibit teaching a 
particular scientific theory for reasons that run counter to the 
principles of the First Amendment.
By and large, public education in our Nation is comnitted to the 
control of state and local authorities. Courts do not and cannot 
intervene in the resolution of conflicts which arise in the daily 
operation of school systems and which do not directly and sharply 
implicate basic constitutional values. On the other hand,
”[ t >  vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere 
more vital than in the carmunity of American schools," Shelton 
v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960). As this court said in 
Keyishian v. Board of Regents, the First Amendment "does not 
tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom.” 
(Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 104-105, 1968)
Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) 
and Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972). The interpretation of 
tenure laws and dismissal of tenured and nontenured teachers has become 
an area of concern in employee rights during recent years. The 
companion cases of Roth and Sindermann illustrate the position of the 
Court. Roth, a nontenured university teacher was notified that he would 
not be rehired for the ensuing year. University rules provided that no 
reason need be given for nonretention of a nontenured teacher. Roth
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claimed deprivation of hia Fourteenth Amendment rights, claiming 
infringement of his free speech right (because, he claimed, the true 
reason for his nonretention was his criticism of the university 
administration), and infringement of his procedural due process right 
because of the university’s failure to inform him of the basis for its 
decision not to rehlrc him. The court ruled that
the Fourteenth Amendment does not require opportunity for a hearing 
prior to the nonrenewal of a nontenured state teacher's contract, 
unless he can show that the nonrenewal deprived him of an interest 
in "liberty" or that he had a "property" interest in continued 
employment, despite the lack of .tenure or a formal contract. Here 
the nonretention of respondent, absent any charges against him or 
stigma or disability foreclosing other employment, is not 
tantamount to a deprivation of "liberty," and the terms of 
respondent's employment accorded him no "property" interest 
protected by procedural due process. (Hoard of Regents of State 
Colleges v. Roth, 400 U.S. 564, 1972)
Sindermann had been employed by the Texas college system for ton 
years under a series of one-year contracts and was without formal tenure 
rights. After the Board of Regents declined to renew his contract for 
the ensuing year, without giving him an explanation or prior hearing, 
Sindermann brought action alleging that the decision not to rehire him 
was based on his public criticism of the college administration and thus 
infringed his free speech right, and that the Regents' failure to afford 
him a hearing violated his right to procedural due process. Although he 
had no formal tenure rights, Sindermann claimed do facto tenure based on
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the language of the college's Faculty Guide and on the guidelines 
pronulgated for the Texas College and University System. These guidelines 
provide that a teacher with seven years of employment in the system is 
tenured and can only be dismissed for cause.
The Court declared that Sindermann's public criticism of his 
college's administration was a constitutionally protected right and could 
not legitimately be used as the baBis for termination of employment.
This right not to be discharged for constitutionally protected conduct 
does not depend on the presence or absence of a contractual or tenure 
right to employment. The First Amendment prohibits state action which 
impairs freedom of speech and expression. A person may not be denied a 
governmental benefit because of his exercise of constitutionally 
protected rights.
The Court ruled in favor of Sindermann on his claim that the Regents 
failed to provide him a hearing prior to his dismissal, thus violating 
his right to due process of law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Although Sindermann had no formal tenure right, his objective 
expectation of reemployment, based on the college's de facto tenure 
policy, entitled him to the procedural safeguards of due process before 
termination of employment. Unlike the Roth decision, Sindermann's 
objective expectation of tenure creates a "property" interest in continued 
employment which is protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.
McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Service Conmisslon, A2A U.S. 645 
(1976). After serving the city of Philadelphia as a fireman for sixteen
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years, appellant McCarthy moved his permanent residence from Philadelphia 
to Hew Jersey, resulting in the termination of his enployment. A 
Philadelphia municipal ordinance required employees of the city to reside 
in Philadelphia. The fireman challenged the constitutionality of the 
ordinance.
The appellant claimed that the Philadelphia ordinance violated his 
federally-protected right of interstate travel. Citing a similar 
decision by the Michigan Supreme Court on a similar requirement by the 
city of Detroit, the United States Supreme Court held the Philadelphia 
ordinance "to be constitutional as a bona fide continuing residence 
requirement and not to violate the right of interstate travel of 
appellant . . . "  (McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Service Commission,
424 U.S. 645, 1976).
Hortonvllle Joint School District Ho. 1 v. Hortonville Education 
Association, 426 U.S. 482 (1976). Prolonged negotiations for renewal of 
a collective-bargaining contract between teachers and a Wisconsin school 
board failed to produce a contract. ' Under Wisconsin law, the board has 
the power to negotiate terms of employment and is the only body empowered 
to employ and dismiss teachers. There is no statute providing for review 
of board decisions on such matters. After repeated unsuccessful efforts 
at negotiating a new contract, the teachers went on strike in direct 
violation of Wisconsin law. The board subsequently terminated the 
striking teachers' employment, whereupon the teachers brought suit 
contending that they had been denied due process of law required by the
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Fourteenth Amendment because they had been discharged by the school board, 
a decision-making body that they claimed was not impartial.
The Court concluded that the. "Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment did not guarantee respondent teachers that the decision to 
terminate their employment would be made or reviewed 'by a body other than 
the School Board" (Bortonvllle Joint' School District No. 1 v. Hortonville 
Education Association, 426 U.S. 482, 1976).
Mr. Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion of the Court:
Our assessment of the interests of the parties in this case leads to 
the conclusion that . . . the Board's prior role as negotiator does 
not disqualify it to decide that the public interest in maintaining 
uninterrupted classroom work required that teachers striking in 
violation of state law be discharged. (Hortonville Joint School 
District No. 1 v. Hortonville Education Association, 426 U.S. 494, 
1976).
In his concluding remarks, Mr. Chief Justice Burger stated:
Respondents have failed to demonstrate that the decision to terminate 
their employment was infected by the sort of bias that we have held 
to disqualify other decisionmakers as a matter of federal due process. 
A showing that the Board was "involved" in the events preceding this 
decision, in light of the important interest in leaving with the 
Board the power given by the state legislature, is not enough to 
overcome the presumption of honesty and integrity in policymakers and 
decisionmaking power . . . .  Accordingly, we hold that the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not guarantee 
respondents that the decision to terminate their employment would be
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made or reviewed by a body other than the School Board, (Hortonville 
Joint School District Ho. 1 v. Hortonville Education Association,
426 U.S. 496-497, 1976)
national League of Cities v. Usery. Secretary of Labor, 426 U.S.
833 (1976). The original Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 required every 
employer "engaged in commerce or in the production of goodB for commerce" 
to pay each employee certain minimum wages and overtime pay for work 
performed in excess of a specified number of hours. The original Act 
specifically excluded states as employers. In 1961, the Act's coverage 
was extended beyond employees directly connected with interstate commerce 
to include all employees of enterprises engaged in commerce or in 
production for commerce. In 1966, the definition of "employer" was 
extended to include the state governments with respect to employees of 
state hospitals, institutions, and schools. In Maryland v. Wlrtz (1968), 
the United States declued the 1961 and 1966 amendments to the Fair Labor 
Standards Act constitutional. In 1974, the Act was again amended so as 
to extend the Act's minimum wage and maximum hour provisions to all 
employees of the states and their political subdivisions. In National 
League of Cities v. Usery, Secretary of Labor (1976), a number of cities 
and states challenged the validity of the 1974 amendments.
The Court held that the 1974 amendments were not within the 
authority granted to Congress by the Commerce Clause.
In attempting to exercise its Commerce Clause power to prescribe 
minimum wages and maximum hours to be paid by the States in their 
sovereign capacities, Congress has sought to wield its power in a
fashion that would impair the States' “ability to function 
effectively in a federal System," . . . and this exercise of 
congressional authority does not comport with the federal system 
of government embodied in the Constitution. (National League of 
Cities v. Userv. Secretary of Labor. 42S U.S. 833, 1976)
The Court ruled that not only were the 1974 amendments 
unconstitutional, but it also determined that the 1966 amendments were 
unconstitutional, thus overruling their 1968 decision in Maryland v.
Wirtz (1968).
The Tenth Amendment forbids Congress to exercise power in a- fashion 
that would impair the integrity of the states as governmental units or 
their ability to function in a federal system. In Mr. Justice Rehnquist's 
opinion he claimed,
One undoubted attribute of state sovereignty is the State's power to 
determine the wages which shall be paid to those whom they employ in 
order to carry out their governmental functions, what hours those 
persons will work, and what compensation will be provided where these 
employees may be called upon to work overtime. (National League of 
Cities v. U'sery, Secretary of Labor, 426 U.S. 845, 1976)
He concluded: “We hold that insofar as the challenged amendments
operate to directly displace the States' freedom to structure integral 
operations in areas of traditional governmental functions, they are not 
within the authority granted Congress . . .“ .(National League of Cities - 
v. Usery, Secretary of Labor, 426 U.S. 852, 1976).
Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1976). A 
Michigan statute authorizing union representation of local governmental
employees permitted an "agency shop" arrangement, whereby every employee 
represented by the union must pay union dues even though not a union 
member. Any employee who failed to comply faced discharge from 
employment. In 1969, the Detroit Federation of Teachers entered into an 
"agency shop" agreement with the Detroit Board of Education. Teachers 
opposed to collective bargaining in the public sector challenged the 
constitutionality of an agreement which forced them to contribute 
financially to support the union's collective bargaining activities.
They also challenged the allocation of part of their "service charge" to 
the support of a variety of union activities they alleged were economic, 
political, professional, or religious in nature and not related to the 
union's collective-bargaining function.
The Court ruled in favor of the union on the collective-bargaining 
complaint and in favor of the non-union teachers on the activities not 
related to collective-bargaining activities. The Court held that "service 
charges” to non-members are valid when those charges are used for 
collective-bargaining, contract-administration, and grievance-adjustment 
purposes. "However, the Constitution requires that funds paid by 
employees as a condition of continued government employment not be used 
by the union for ideological, political purposes which are not directly 
related to its collective-bargaining function" (Zirkel, 197Bb, p. 72).
Mr. Justice Stewart addressed this point as follows;
Our decisions establish with unmistakable clarity that the freedom 
of an individual to associate for the purpose of advancing beliefs 
and ideas is protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments . . . .  
Equally clear is the proposition that a government may not require
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an individual to relinquish rights guaranteed him by the First 
Amendment as a condition of public employment . . . .  The appellants 
argue that they fall within the protection of these cases because 
they have been prohibited, not from actively associating, but rather 
from refusing to associate. They specifically argue that they may 
constitutionally prevent the Union's spending a part of their 
required service fees to contribute to political candidates and to 
express political views unrelated to its duties as exclusive 
bargaining representative. We have concluded that this argument is 
a meritorious one. fflbood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 
233-234, 1976)
Harrah Independent School District v. Martin. 440 U.S. 194 (1979).
The respondent, a tenured teacher in Oklahoma, was denied salary increases 
during the 1972-74 school years because of her refusal to comply with her 
school board's continuing-education requirement which was one of the terms 
of her employment contract. When the Oklahoma legislature enacted a 
statute mandating salary increases for teachers regardless of their 
compliance with the continuing-education requirement, the school board 
notified the respondent that her contract for 1974-75 school year would 
not be renewed unless she satisfied the continuing-education requirement. 
When she refused to comply, the school board determined that her persistent 
noncompliancc constituted "willful neglect"of duty'" and refused to renew 
her contract for the ensuing year. Martin brought action against the 
school district, claiming that she had been denied "liberty" and "property"
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without due process of law and equal protection of the laws, as guaranteed 
by the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court decreed that the. school board's actions did not violate 
respondent's due process rights.
The School District has conceded at all times that respondent was a 
"tenured" teacher . . . and therefore could be dismissed only for 
specified reasons. She was accorded the usual elements of procedural 
due process. Shortly after the Board's April 1974 meeting, she was 
advised of the decision not to renew her contract and of her right 
to a hearing before the Board. At respondent's request, a hearing 
was held at which both she and her attorney appeared and 
unsuccessfully contested the Board's determination that her refusal 
to enroll in the continuing-education courses constituted ."wilful 
neglect of duty." Thus, . . . respondent has no colorable claim of 
a denial of procedural due process. (Harrah Independent School 
District v. Martin. 440 U.S. 197-198, 1979)
Nor did the Court find that the respondent had been denied 
substantive due process.
Respondent's claim that the Board acted arbitrarily in imposing a 
new penalty for noncompliance with the continuing-education 
requirement simply does not square with the facts. By making pay 
raises mandatory, the state legislature deprived the Board of the 
sanction that it had earlier used to enforce its teachers' 
contractual obligation to earn continuing-education credits. The 
Board thus turned to contract nonrenewal, but applied this sanction 
purely prospectively so that those who might have relied on its
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past practice would nonetheless have an opportunity to bring 
themselves into compliance with the terms of their contracts . . . .  
Such a course of conduct on the part of a school board responsible 
for the public education of students within its jurisdiction, and 
employing teachers to perform the principal portion of that task, 
can scarcely be described as arbitrary. Respondent's claim of 
denial of substantive due process under these circumstances is 
wholly untenable. (Harrah Independent School District v. Martin,
440 U.S. 198-199, 1979)
Likewise, so held the Court, the respondent was not denied equal 
protection of the laws. The Court ruled that the school board's concern 
with the educational qualifications of its teacher could not be considered 
impermissible. The school board's continuing-education requirement was 
viewed as a legitimate governmental concern. "The sanction of contract 
nonrenewal is quite rationally related to the Board's objective of 
enforcing the continuing-education obligation of its teachers. Respondent 
was not, therefore, deprived of equal protection of the laws" (Harrah 
Independent School District v. Martin, 440 U.S. 201, 1979).
Church and State Relationships
Most cases involving church-state relationships have required the 
courts to make an interpretation of the First Amendment to the United 
States Constitution which provides, in part, that "Congress shall make no 
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof" (United States Constitution, Amendment One). The 
prohibitions against Congressional action described in the First
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Amendment are likewise applied to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall 
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws. (United States Constitution, 
Amendment Fourteen)
The first phrase of the First Amendment is known as the establishment 
Clause. Two classes of cases have been decided within the interpretation 
of the Establishment Clause: cases involving the activity of states in
promoting religion by mandating or permitting prayer or Bible reading, and 
cases involving the use of tax revenue to aid church-related institutions.
In most instances, when the states have mandated or permitted Bible 
reading, prayer, or religious instruction, the Supreme Court has held the 
legislation in question to be unconstitutional. In those cases where 
states have allocated tax revenues to church-related institutions, the 
Court has allowed such aid when it benefits the child and has disallowed 
it when the sectarian institution is the recipient of the aid.
The courts have applied the following three-part test in recent 
Establishment Clause cases: First, does the statute in question have a
"secular legislative purpose"? Second, does its "primary effect" neither 
advance nor inhibit religion? Third, does the statute and its 
administration avoid excessive government entanglement with religion? If 
the Court concludes that the statute before them requires a negative 
answer to any one of these three questions, it is likely that the statute 
will be declared unconstitutional.
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The second phrase of the First amendment is known as the Free 
Exercise Clause. There have been relatively few decisions by the Supreme 
Court involving this clause, but two significant issues have been 
determined by the Court on the banis of the Free Exercise Clause: the
flag salute and the applicability of compulsory school attendance laws 
for certain religious sects.
Cochran v. Louisiana State Board of Education, 281 U.S. 370 (1930).
A Louisiana law provided that tax revenue be spent to supply textbooks to 
all school children at no charge. Students of both public and private 
schools were the recipients of these books. Some of the private schools 
included were admittedly sectarian^ A group of taxpayers sought to 
prevent the Louisiana state board of education from expending funds to 
purchase school books and supply them free of charge to the school 
children of the state, contending that such expenditures were in violation 
of bath the state and federal Constitutions and the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the federal Constitution.
The Court held that the Louisiana law providing textbooks to 
children attending private sectarian schools as well as those attending 
public schools was constitutional. The Fourteenth Amendment’s prohibition 
against the deprivation of life, liberty, and property without due process 
of law is not applicable in this case because the provision of books to 
all school children served a public interest and did not benefit the 
interest of the private schools or of parents of students attending those 
private schools.
In affirming the decision of the Louisiana Supreme Court;
Mr. Chief Justice HugheB quoted from that court's holding:
The appropriations were made Cor the specific purpose of purchasing 
school books for the use of the school children of the state, free 
of cost to them. It was for their benefit and the resulting benefit 
to the state that the appropriations were made . . . .  The schools, 
however, are not the beneficiaries of these appropriations. . . .
The school children and the state alone are the beneficiaries. 
{Cochran v. Louisiana State Board of Education, 281 U.S. 374-375, 
1930)
Board of Education of Central School District Mo. 1 v. Allen,
Commissioner of Education of Hew York, 392 U.S. 236 (1968). In another 
case involving the free use of textbooks for private schools, the Court 
upheld the constitutionality of a New York statute. The New York law 
required local public school authorities to loan textbooks free of 
charge to all students, of both public and private schools, in grades 
seven through twelve. A local school board sought a declaration that 
the statute was unconstitutional as violative of bath clauses of the 
First Amendment.
As in the Cochran decision, the Court ruled that such a law is 
permissible. In the opinion of the Supreme Court the statute in 
question did not violate the First Amendment's prohibition of a state- 
established religion or prevent the free exercise of religion. Since 
the law was to benefit all school children, whether enrolled in public 
or private schools, and since only textbooks approved by school 
authorities could be loaned, the Court concluded that the statute was 
completely neutral with respect to religion.
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The express purpose of the statute was the furtherance of educational 
opportunities for the young, and the law merely makes available to 
all children the benefits of a general program to lend school books 
free of charge, and the financial benefit is to parents and children, 
not to schools. (Board of Education of Central School District Ho. 1 
v. Allen, Commissioner of Education of Hew York, 392 U.S. 236, 1968}
Meek v. Pittenger. Secretary of Education, 421 U.S. 349 (1975). In 
1972 the General Assembly of Pennsylvania passed two acts which provided 
"auxiliary services" (Act 194) and "instructional materials and equipment" 
and loans of textbooks (Act 195) free of charge to nonpublic elementary 
and secondary schools. The "auxiliary services" of Act 194 included 
counseling, testing, psychological services, speech and hearing therapy, 
and related services for exceptional, remedial, or educationally 
disadvantaged students. The "instructional materials" of Act 195 made 
periodicals, textbooks, photographs, maps, charts, recordings, and films 
available to nonpublic schools; the "instructional equipment" included 
projectors, recorders, and laboratory equipment. The validity of the two 
acts was challenged.
The Supreme Court declared Act 194 and all but the textbook loan 
provision of Act 195 unconstitutional, violating the Establishment Clause 
of the First Amendment as made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.
Citing its decision in Board of Education v. Allen (1968), the 
Court upheld the constitutionality of the textbook loan provisions.
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Act 195's textbooks loan provisions, which are limited to textbooks 
acceptable for use in the public schools, are constitutional since 
they "merely make available to all children the benefits of a 
general program to lend school books free of charge," and the 
"financial benefit is to parents and children, not to schools."
(Meek v. Plttenger, Secretary of Education, 421 U.S. 350, 1975)
While the Court allowed the state loan of secular textbooks to 
nonpublic schools', it found that the provision of "auxiliary services" 
and "instructional materials and equipment" was in violation of the 
Establishment Clause because it provided too direct and substantial an 
aid to private sectarian schools.
The direct loan of instructional materials and equipment to nonpublic 
schools authorized by Act 195 has the unconstitutional primary effect 
of establishing religion because of the predominantly religious 
character of the schools benefiting from the Act since 75% of 
Pennsylvania's nonpublic schools that comply with the compulsory- 
attendance law and thus qualify for aid under Act 195 are church 
related or religiously affiliated. The massive aid that nonpublic 
schools receive is neither'indirect nor incidental, and even 
though such aid is ostensibly limited to secular instructional 
material and equipment the inescapable result is the direct and 
substantial advancement of religious activity . . . .  Act 194 also 
violates the Establishment Clause because the auxiliary services are 
provided at predominantly church-related schools. (Meek v. Plttenger, 
Secretary of Education, 421 U.S. 349-350, 1975)
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Vtolman v. Walter. 433 U.S. 229 (1977). An Ohio law authorized 
various £orms of aid to nonpublic schools, most of which were sectarian. 
The Ohio Statute authorized funding for the following purposes:
(1) purchasing secular textbooks; (2) supplying standardized testing and 
scoring services; (3) providing speech and hearing diagnostic services 
and diagnostic psychological services; (4) supplying to students needing 
specialized attention, therapeutic, guidance, and remedial services;
(5) purchasing and loaning to pupils or their parents instructional 
materials and equipment; and (6) providing field trip transportation and 
services. A group of citizens and taxpayers challenged the statute.
In the opinion of the Court, as. delivered by Mr. Justice Blackmun, 
those portions of the law authorizing the state to provide nonpublic 
school students with textbooks, standardized testing and scoring, 
diagnostic services, and therapeutic and remedial services arc 
constitutional. Those portions authorizing the state to provide 
instructional materials and equipment and field trip services are' 
unconstitutional, violating the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment.
The Court applied the three-part test to the Ohio statute: 
in order to pass constitutional muster under the Establishment Clause 
a statute (1) must have a secular legislative purpose; (2) must have 
a principal or primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits 
religion; and (3) must not foster an excessive government entanglement 
with religion. (Holman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 231, 1977)
The Court had no difficulty with the first part of the test; the analytical 
difficulty has to do with the effect and entanglement criteria.
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The textbook loan system was similar to those approved by the Court 
in Board of Education v. Allen (1968) and in Meek v. Pittenger (1975). 
Because the testing and scoring.program was not controlled by the 
nonpublic school, and thus there was no need for direct financial aid 
(effect) or supervision (entanglement), that portion of the Ohio law was 
declared constitutional.
Providing speech and hearing diagnostic services and diagnostic 
psychological services on the nonpublic school premises
will not create an iinpermissible risk of fostering ideological views; 
hence there is no need for excessive surveillance and there will not 
be impermissible church-state entanglement. The provision of health 
services to nonpublic as well as public school children does not 
have the primary effect of aiding religion. (Wolman v. Walter, 433 
U.S. 230, 1977)
Therefore, that section of the Ohio law that provided for diagnostic 
services was found to be constitutional.
Similarly, the therapeutic, guidance, and remedial services, which 
were offered only on religiously neutral sites away from the nonpublic 
sectarian school, did not have the impermissible effect of advancing 
religion. And since those services would be administered only by public 
employees, no excessive entanglement would result. Thus, the provision 
of therapeutic, guidance, and remedial services was declared constitutional.
The Court concluded that the loan of instructional materials and 
equipment, even though limited to neutral and secular materials and 
equipment, had the primary effect of "providing a direct and substantial 
advancement of sectarian education . . . .  It is impossible to separate
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the secular education function from the sectarian, and hence the state 
aid in part inevitably supports the religious role of the schools" (Wolman 
v. Walter. 433 U.S. 230, 1977). Therefore, that paragraph of the Ohio 
law providing for the purchase and loan of instructional materials and 
equipment was declared unconstitutional.
The state support of nonpublic school field trips is a benefit to 
sectarian education rather than to individual students. Also, the state 
surveillance of nonpublic school field trips would result in excessive 
entanglement. Thus, that section of the Ohio law providing for state 
financing of nonpublic school field trip transportation and services 
failed to pass "constitutional muster" on two counts. Such a statute would 
serve to advance religion and would foster an excessive government 
entanglement with religion.
Everson v. Board of Education of the Township of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1
(1947). A Hew Jersey statute authorized local boards of education to make
rules and contracts for the transportation of children to and from schools.
Acting in accordance with the state statute, one school board authorized
the reimbursement of parents for fares paid -for the transportation of
children attending public and Catholic schools. Although the state statute
excluded such arrangements for students attending private schools operated
for a profit, it allowed such arrangements for students enrolled in
private, sectarian, not-for-profit schools. In this case, a district
taxpayer challenged the validity of the state's statute and of the school
board's resolution allowing reimbursement to parents for the transportation
*
of children attending sectarian schools. The appellant argued that the
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Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was being violated because 
the statute and resolution authorized the state to take by taxation the 
private property of some and bestow it upon others, to be used for their 
own private purposes. The appellant also claimed that the statute and 
resolution forced citizens to pay taxes which were used to help support 
and maintain sectarian schools,, contrary to the prohibition of the First 
Amendment's Establishment Clause.
By a five-to-four majority, the Court held that a law authorizing 
reimbursement of the parents of school children for bus fares to and 
from private, sectarian schools, when included in a general program of 
reimbursement for the bus fares of public school children, is 
constitutional. In response to the appellant's allegation that the 
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause was being violated, the Court 
claimed that "the New Jersey legislature has decided that a public 
purpose will be served by using tax-raised funds to pay the bus fares 
of all school children, including those who attend parochial schools" 
(Everson v. Board of Education of the Township of Ewing. 330 U.S. 6, 
1947). The state can legitimately decide that the safe transportation 
of all school children is in the public interest.
The Court also failed to allow the allegation that the
reimbursement scheme violated the First Amendment, claiming instead that
the statute and resolution were demonstrations of neutrality toward 
religion rather than support or establishment of it. The First Amendment 
"requires the state to be neutral in its relations with groups of
religious believers and non-believers; it does not require the state to
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be their adversary" {Everson v. Board of Education of the Township of 
Ewing. 330 U.S. 18, 1947).
Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education of School District
Ho. 71, Champaign County, Illinois, 333 U.S. 203 (194B). An Illinois
board of education granted permission to representatives of the Catholic,
Protestant, and Jewish faiths to teach religion classes once a week to
students in grades four though nine. Pupils whose parents so requested
were granted "released time" for religious instruction and were excused
from their regular secular schedule for that period of time. Other
students were required to remain in their regular classes. The religion
teachers were employed by a private, interfaith association and were* '
subject to the approval and supervision of the superintendent of schools. 
The religious instruction was held during school hours and inside school 
facilities. A resident and taxpayer of the school district challenged 
the constitutionality of the program.
Mr. Justice Black delivered the opinion of the Court; "This is beyond 
all question a utilization of the tax-established and tax-supported public 
school system to aid religious groups to spread their faith. And it falls 
squarely under the ban of the First Amendment . . . "  (Illinois ex rel. 
McCollum v. Board of Education of School District Ho. 71.'Champaign County, 
Illinois. 333 U.S. 210, 1948). The First Amendment prohibits the 
establishment of religion and requires, in the words of Jefferson, a "wall 
of separation between church and state." A program permitting religious 
instruction within public school's during school hours and excusing students
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from their regular secular schedule is unconstitutional because it fails 
to maintain the required separation of church and state.
Zn his opinion, Mr. Justice Frankfurter concluded:
We renew our conviction that Hwe have staked the very existence of 
our country on the faith that complete separation between the state 
and religion is best for the state and best for religion" (Everson 
v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 59, 1947). If nowhere else, in the 
relation between Church and State, "good fences make good 
neighbors." (Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education of 
School District No. 71, Champaign County, Illinois, 333 U.S. 232,
1948.
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952). Pursuant to a section of the 
New Vork Education Law, the New York City board of education permitted its 
public schools to release students during school hours, on written 
permission of their parents, so that they might leave the school building 
to go to religious centers for religious instruction or devotional
I
exercises. Those students who are not released for religious purposes are 
required to remain in school. The participating religious centers 
provided weekly reports to the schools, sending the names of children 
released from the schools who failed to report for religious instruction.
All costs of this program were paid for by the religious organizations 
involved. The program involved neither religious instruction in the public 
school buildings nor expenditure of public funds. Taxpayers and residents 
of New York City challenged the law, contending that it was in essence not 
different from the one involved in tho McCollum case.
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The Court upheld the constitutionality of this section of the 
New York Education Law, The Court argued that in releasing children 
from school for religious instruction the state had not acted counter 
to the First Amendment. As long as the religious instruction takes 
place outside the schools' facilities and requires no state financial 
support there can be no claim of an establishment of religion. The 
opinion of the Court was delivered by Mr. Justice Douglas, who concluded 
by saying:
In the McCollum case the classrooms were used for religious 
instruction and the force of the public school was used to promote 
that instruction. Here . . . the public schools do no more than 
accommodate their schedules to a program of outside religious 
instruction. We follow the McCollum case. Gut we cannot expand it 
to cover the present released time program unless separation of Church 
and State means that public instruction can make no adjustments of 
their schedules to acconmodate the religious needs of the people. We 
cannot read into the Bill of Rights such a philosophy of hostility to 
religion. (Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 315, 1952) ■
Engel v. Vitale, 37 0 U.S. 421 (1962). The New York Board of Regents, 
overseers of that state's public school system, composed a twenty-two word 
nondenominational prayer as a part of their "Statement on Moral and 
Spiritual Training in the Schools" program. This prayer was published and 
distributed to the local boards of education throughout the state with the 
recommendation that it be recited at the beginning of each school day by 
the students in the public schools of New York. Shortly after one local
73
school district began the practice of reciting the prayer, the parents of 
ten students brought action in a New York State Court. These parents 
claimed that the actions of official governmental agencies in ordering 
the recitation of the prayer had violated the Establishment Clause of the 
First Amendment. The state courts of New York upheld the practice of 
reciting the Regents' prayer so long as the schools did not compel any 
student to join in the prayer. Students who were offended by the prayer 
were allowed to remain silent or to be excused from the room while the 
prayer was being recited.
The Court decided that the state's encouragement of the regular 
recitation of prayer in the public school system was in direct violation 
of the First Amendment's prohibition of a governmental establishment of 
religion.
The fact that the program, as modified and approved by state courts, 
does not require all pupils to recite the prayer but permits those 
who wish to do so to remain silent or be excused from the room, 
ignores the essential nature of the program's constitutional defects. 
Neither the fact that the prayer may be denominationally neutral nor 
the fact that its observance on the part of students is voluntary can 
serve to free it from the limitations of the Establishment Clause, 
as it might from the Free Exercise Clause, of the First Amendment, 
both of which arc operative against the States by virtue of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. (Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 430, 1962)
School District of Abinqton Township, Pennsylvania v. Schempp, Murray 
v. Curlett, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). A Pennsylvania law'required that at least
ten verses from the Bible be read without comment at the opening of each 
school day. This Bible reading was followed by the recitation of the 
Lord's Prayer. Participation in these exercises was voluntary, and 
students and parents were advised that the student could absent himself 
from the classroom or, should he choose to remain in the room, not 
participate in the exercise. The city of Baltimore had a similar 
provision, consisting of the reading, without comment, of a chapter from 
the Bible and/or the recitation of the Lord's Prayer. The Schempp and 
Murray families challenged the constitutionality of the state statute and 
municipal regulations, respectively.
The Court struck down the Pennsylvania statute and the Baltimore 
regulations as unconstitutional, clearly contradictory of the Establishment 
Clause of the First Amendment.
The conclusion follows that in both cases the laws require religious 
exercises and such exercises are being conducted in direct violation 
of the rights of the appellees and petitioners. Nor are these 
required exercises mitigated by the fact that individual students 
may absent themselves upon parental request, for that fact furnishes 
no defense to a claim of unconstitutionality under the Establishment 
Clause. (School District of Ablngton Township, Pennsylvania v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 224-225)
Chamberlin v. Dade County Board of Public Instruction. 377 U.S. 402 
1964). A Florida statute required devotional Bible reading and the 
recitation of prayers in Florida public schools. The Florida Supreme 
Court declared the statute constitutional, but the United States Supreme
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Court reversed the Florida Supreme Court's decision per curiam declaring 
the Florida statute unconstitutional. Following their decision in School 
District of flbinqton Township v. Schempp (1963), the Court held that the 
reading of Bible verses and the recitation of prayers on school property, 
during school hours, and under the supervision of school personnel was 
in violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment 
(Chamberlin v. Dade County Board of Public Instruction, 377 U.S. 402,
1964).
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). Members of the Old Order 
Amish religion and the Conservative Amish Mennonite Church were convicted 
of violating Wisconsin's con$>ulsory school-attendance law. This 
Wisconsin law required a child's school attendance until age sixteen.
The Amish respondents refused to send their children to any formal school,' 
public or1 private, after they had graduated from the eighth grade because 
they believed that high school attendance was contrary to their religion 
and way of life and that they would endanger their own salvation and that 
of their children by complying with the law. The evidence showed that 
the Amish provide continuing informal vocation training for their children 
which is specifically designed to prepare them for adult life and 
religious practice within the Amish community. Testimony was also 
presented which showed that the Amish children would likely become self- 
sufficient citizens. Three Amish families challenged the constitutionality 
of the Wisconsin compulsory school-attendance law as it applied to them, 
claiming that it violated the Free Exercise clause of the First Amendment.
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The Court ruled in favor of the Amish, declaring the Wisconsin 
compulsory attendance law unconstitutional.
Thus, a State's interest in universal education, however highly we 
rank it, is not totally free from a balancing process when it 
impinges on fundamental rights and interests, such as those 
specifically protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First 
Amendment, and the traditional interest of parents with respect to 
the religious upbringing of their children . . . .  [Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 214, 1972)
The Court concluded that the Amish had adequately supported their 
claim that enforcement of the compulsory attendance law after the eighth 
grade would prevent the free exercise of their religious beliefs.
In sum, the unchallenged testimony of acknowledged experts in 
education and religious history, almost 300 years of consistent 
practice, and strong evidence of a sustained faith pervading and 
regulating respondents' entire mode of life support the claim that 
enforcement of the State's requirement of compulsory formal education 
after the eighth grade would gravely endanger if not destroy the free 
exercise of respondents' religious beliefs. (Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 
U.S. 219, 1972)
The Court also denied the state's argument that it was empowered as 
parens patriae to override the parents' interest for the benefit of the 
children. The Amish respondents presented convincing evidence that their 
way of life would not impair the physical or mental health of the children 
and would not create adults incapable, of being self-supporting, responsible 
citizens.
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Mr. Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion of the Court and 
concluded:
Aided by a history of three centuries as an identifiable religious 
sect and a long history as a successful and self-sufficient segment 
of American society, the Amish in this case have convincingly 
demonstrated the sincerity of their religious beliefs, the 
interrelationship of belief with their mode of life, the vital role 
that belief and daily conduct play in the continued survival of Old 
Order Amish communities and their religious organization, and the 
hazards presented by the State's enforcement of a statute generally 
valid as to others. Beyond this, they have carried the even more 
difficult burden of demonstrating the adequacy of their alternative 
mode of continuing informal vocational education in terms of precisely 
those overall interests that the State advances in support of its 
program of compulsory high school education. Zn light of this 
convincing showing, one that probably few other religious groups or 
sects could make, and weighing the minimal difference between what 
the State would require and what the Amish already accept, it was 
incumbent on the State to show with more particularity how its 
admittedly strong interest in compulsory education would be adversely 
affected by granting an exemption to the Amish. (Wisconsin v. Yoder, 
406 U.S. 235-236, 1972)
Wheeler v. Barrera. 417 U.S. 402 C1974). Chapter I (formerly Title I) 
of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 provides for 
federal funding of remedial programs for educationally deprived children
in both public and private schools. The primary responsibility for 
designing and implementing such a program rests with the local educational 
agency, which program must then be approved by the state educational 
agency and the U.S. Department of Education. Respondents, parents of 
children attending nonpublic schools in Kansas City, Missouri, brought 
class action against state school officials, alleging that the state 
school officials had "arbitrarily and illegally" approved a Title I plan 
(so called here because it was under this designation that the Supreme 
Court heard this case) that deprived private school children of services 
comparable to those offered to public school children. The defendants, 
state school officials, claimed that the aid sought by the respondents 
exceeded Title I's requirements and violated the State's Constitution, 
state law, and public policy.
The Title I Handbook stated only that the local educational agency's 
plan provide eligible private school students with services that were 
"comparable in quality, scope, and opportunity for participation to those 
provided for public school children with needs of equally high priority." 
The law does not require that identical services be provided. Although 
over sixty-five percent of Title I funds allocated to Missouri had been 
used to provide personnel for remedial instruction, state officials had 
refused to appropriate any money to provide similar remedial instruction 
at nonpublic schools.
The Supreme Court decided that the state school officials had failed 
to comply with the Elementary and Secondary Education Act's requirements. 
But the Court cautioned that their decision was not to be interpreted to 
mean that the state school officials were required to submit and approve
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plans that employed the use of Title I teachers on private school premises 
during regular school hours. This on-the-premises private school 
instruction by public school Title 1 teachers was what the respondents 
claimed they were entitled to by virtue of the Title 1 provisions.
In the opinion of the Court, as delivered by Mr. Justice Blackmun:
The Court of Appeals properly recognized, as we have noted, that 
petitioners failed to meet their broad obligation and commitment 
under the Act to provide comparable programs, "Comparable,” however, 
does not mean "identical," and, contrary to the assertions of both 
sides, we do not read the Court of Appeals' opinion or, for that 
matter, the Act itself, as ever requiring that identical services be 
provided in nonpublic schools, congress recognized that the needs 
of educationally deprived children attending nonpublic schools might 
be different from those of similar children in public schools; it 
was also recognized that in some States certain programs for private 
and parochial schools would be legally impossible because of state 
constitutional restrictions, most notable in the church-state area 
. . . .  Title I was not intended to override these individualized 
state restrictions. Rather, there was a clear intention that the 
assistance programs be designed on local levels so as to accommodate 
the restrictions. (Wheeler v. Barrera. 417 U.S. 420-421, 1974) 
Although it may be difficult, the Court said, it is not impossible 
to design and implement a legal Title I program that would provide 
"comparable" services despite the prohibition of on-the-premises 
instruction in the private schools.
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Under the Act, respondents are entitled to comparable services . . . . 
As we have stated repeatedly herein, they are not entitled to any 
particular form of service, and it is the role of the state and local 
agencies, and not of the federal courts, at least at this stage, to 
formulate a suitable plan. (Wheeler v. Barrera, 417 U.S. 428, 1974}
Race, Language, and Sex Discrimination
One of the distinguishing characteristics of the American ideal has 
been the tradition of compulsory, universal education through a system of 
free, public schools. This tradition carries with it the notion that 
education is available to all, regardless of their cultural, racial, 
religious, or ethnic background. Because ours is a pluralistic society, 
the problems of universal education for all Americans have been 
considerable. As a result there have been a number of court cases 
involving alleged discriminatory practices in the fulfillment of this 
American dream of universal education.
Discrimination, issues flow primarily from the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the applicable section of which reads:
" . . .  No state shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws" (United States Constitution, Amendment 
Fourteen).
The bulk of the discrimination cases tried in the American judicial 
system have been racial discrimination issues. Perhaps the most well- 
known of all United States Supreme Court decisons impacting on education 
was the Brown v. Board of Education (1954) decision. Zirkel (1978b) 
pointed out that
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in retrospect one sees that when the Supreme Court ruled that 
segregation of school children on the basis of race was 
unconstitutional, the Constitution changed much more significantly 
than the schools. In practice, the decision failed, as Brown II 
(1955) did, to inspire reform in the schools "with all deliberate 
speed." (p, 74)
Another aspect of discrimination emerged with the Lau v. Hichols 
(1974) decision. This decision.and others like it mandated that the 
schools must adapt to meet the language needs of its non-English-speaking 
clientele, in recent years sex discrimination charges have been added to 
the dockets of many of our nation's courts, including the Supreme Court. 
Although there have been relatively few sex discrimination cases tried 
before the Supreme Court, it appears to be an area of increasing litigation.
Plessy v. Ferguson. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). An act of the legislature 
of Louisiana, passed in 1890, required all railway companies to provide 
"equal but separate" accomodations for whites and blacks. A second section 
of the act provided criminal penalties for passengers who insisted on 
being seated in a car not reserved for their own race. Plessy, a citizen 
of the United States and a resident of Louisiana, challenged the 
constitutionality of the Louisiana act, claiming that it violated the 
Thirteenth Amendment, which abolished slavery, and the Due Process and 
Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court upheld the constitutionality of the law requiring 
segregation of the races in railway cars and providing for separate but 
equal facilities. In response to the Thirteenth Amendment argument, the
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Court said:
A statute which implies merely a' legal distinction between the white 
and colored races— a distinction which is founded in the color of the 
two races, and which must alwayB exist so long as white men are 
distinguished from the other race by color— has no tendency to 
destroy the legal equality of the two races, or re-establish a state 
of involuntary servitude. (Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 543, 1896)
The Court also concluded that the Louisiana act did not violate the 
Fourteenth Amendment by abridging the privileges or immunities of United 
States citizens, or depriving persons of liberty or property without due 
process of law, or by denying them the equal protection of the laws. The 
Court determined that although the Fourteenth Amendment required 
political equality between whites and blacks it did not require social 
commingling.
The object of the amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the absolute 
equality of the two races before the law, but, in the nature of 
things, it could not have been intended to abolish distinctions 
based upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from 
political, equality, or a coinningling of the two races upon terms 
unsatisfactory to either. <Plessy v. Ferguson. 163 U.S. 544, 1896)
Gong Lum v. Rice. 275 U.S. 78 (1927). Thirty years after the Plessy 
decision, the State Superintendent of Education of Mississippi excluded 
Gong Lum's daughter from attending a white school because she was of 
Chinese descent and not a member of the white race. The superintendent 
was acting in accordance with a section of the state's constitution which
B3
provided that "separate schools shall be maintained for children of the 
white and colored races." Gong Lum contended that the provisions denied 
him and his daughter equal protection of the laws.
The Court ruled that the Mississippi Constitution did not violate 
the Fourteenth Amendment's Bqual Protection Clause. The state's decision 
to place Chinese students in the black schools and not in schools for 
whites was found to be within the state's authority. The Court held that 
although most cases involving racial discrimination involved separate 
schools for whites and blacks,
. . . we can not think that the question is any different or that 
any different result can be reached . . . where the issue is as 
between white pupils and pupils of the yellow races. The decision 
is within the discretion of the state in regulating its public 
schools and does not conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment. (Gong Lum 
v. Rice, 275 U.S. 87, 1927)
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka ("Brown I"), 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
In what has been proclaimed by many as the most significant Supreme Court 
decision affecting education, the Supreme Court reversed the Plessy 
decision and decreed that the doctrine of "separate but equal" had no place 
in the field of public education. Four separate cases from Kansas,
South Carolina, Virginia, and Delaware were consolidated and decided in 
this landmark case. In each case, black children sought admission to the 
public schools of their community on a non-segregated basis. In each 
case, admission had been denied. Kansas, by state law, permitted but did 
not require separate schools for blacks and whites; South Carolina,
84
Virginia, and Delaware had state constitutional and statutory provisions 
which required the segregation of blacks and whites in the public schools.
Residents and taxpayers who challenged these laws were denied relief 
by the lower courts, except in the Delaware case. The courts in Kansas, 
South Carolina, and Virginia based their decisions on the "separate but 
equal" doctrine permitted under Plessy v. Ferguson (1896). The Delaware 
court granted relief because the schools which black children attended 
were found to be inferior; thus, the "separate but equal" doctrine could 
not validate the Delaware system. The plaintiffs appealed to the highest 
court in the land, contending that "segregated public schools are not 
•equal' and cannot be made 'equal,1 and that hence they are deprived of 
the equal protection of the laws" (Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka. 
347 U.S. 488, 1954).
Mr. Chief Justice Warren presented the question, and the Court's 
answer:
Does segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis 
of race, even though the physical facilities and other "tangible" 
factors may be equal, deprive the children of the minority group of 
equal educational opportunities? We believe that it does. (Brown v . 
Board of Education of TOpeka. 347 U.S. 493, 1954)
We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of 
"separate but equal" has no place. Separate educational facilities 
are inherently unequal. Therefore, we hold, that the plaintiffs and 
others similarly situated for whom the actions have been brought are, 
by reason of the segregation complained of, deprived of the equal
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protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. (Brown 
V. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 495, 1954)
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka ("Brown II”), 349 U.S. 294 
(1955). The Brown I decision declared the fundamental principle that 
racial discrimination in public education is unconstitutional and that all 
provisions of federal, state, and local law which required'or permitted 
such discrimination must yield to this principle.
Recognizing the complexities involved in moving from a dual, 
segregated system to a unitary system of public education, the Court 
provided the following guidelines:
Full implementation of these constitutional principles may require 
solution of varied local school problems. School authorities have 
the primary responsibility for elucidating, assessing, and solving 
these problems; courts will have to consider whether the action of 
school authorities constitutes good faith implementation of the 
governing constitutional principles. (Brown v. Board of Education of 
Topeka. 349 U.S. 299, 1955)
However, the Court pointed out, equal educational opportunity cannot 
be delayed while the public school authorities debate all the particulars 
of compliance. A "prompt and reasonable start" toward full compliance 
was required. Public schools which admitted students on a racially 
nondiscriminatory basis were to become a reality "with all deliberate 
speed."
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Goss v. Board of Education of Knoxville, Tennessee, 373 U.S. 683 
(1963). Nine years after the first Brown decision the Court heard, in 
Goss v. Board of Education (1963), of one of a number of ill-designed 
plans for desegregation. The Court had realized that there would be a 
variety of obstacles that would arise in the transition from dual to 
unitary school systems; but the Court had also mandated "good faith 
compliance at the earliest practicable date." Two Tennessee school 
boards had proposed desegregation' plans which provided for the rezoning 
of school districts without reference to race. Each plan also contained 
a transfer provision which would allow any student to request a transfer 
from the school to which he was assigned to a school where he would be in 
the racial majority.
Black students and their parents challenged the desegregation plans 
of these two school boards. Mr. Justice Clark observed:
The question centers around substantially similar transfer provisions 
incorporated in formal desegregation plans adopted by the respective 
local school boards pursuant to court orders. The claim is that the 
transfer programs are invalid because they are based solely on race 
and tend to perpetuate the pre-existing racially segregated school 
system. Under the over-all desegregation plans presented to the 
trial courts, school districts would be rezoned without reference to 
race. However, by the terms of the transfer provisions, a student, 
upon request, would be permitted, solely on the basis of his own race 
and the racial composition of the school to which he had been assigned 
by virtue of rezoning, to transfer from such school, where he would be
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in the racial minority, back to his former segregated school where 
his race would be in the majority. (Goss v. Board of Education of 
Knoxville, Tennessee, 373 U.S. 6B4, 1963)
The Court reasoned that because the transfer plans were based solely 
on racial factors that they would ultimately lead back to segregation of 
the races and thus served to perpetuate racial segregation. This, the 
Court concluded, ran counter to the mandate of the two Brown decisions, 
and could not be permitted. For this reason the Supreme Court held that 
the transfer plans were in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal 
Protection Clause. Mr. Justice Clark concluded:
Not only is race the factor upon which the transfer plans operate, 
but also the plan lacks a provision whereby a student might with 
equal facility transfer from a segregated to a desegregated school. 
The obvious one-way operation of these two factors in combination 
underscores the purely racial character of and purpose of the 
transfer provisions. We hold that the transfer plans promote 
discrimination and are therefore invalid. (Goss v. Board of Education 
of Knoxville, Tennessee, 373 U.S. 688, 1963)
Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S.
218 (1964). This litigation began in 1951 and was included among the four 
separate cases of Brown I (1954) in which the Supreme Court held that 
Virginia's school segregation laws were unconstitutional. The Court 
ordered in Brown II (1955), that black students of Prince Edward County 
be admitted to the public schools on a racially nondiscriminatory basis 
"with all deliberate speed."
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Efforts to desegregate Prince Edward County public schools met with 
considerable resistance. After an unsuccessful attempt to close any 
public schoolB where whites and blacks were enrolled together and to cut 
off state funds to nonsegregated schools, the General Assembly of 
Virginia,.in 1959, repealed the compulsory attendance law and made school 
attendance a local option. The Prince Edward County school board refused 
to appropriate funds for the operation of public schools. Meanwhile, a 
private foundation operated schools for white children only and in 1960 
became eligible for county and state tuition grants.
The Court ruled that " . . .  closing the Prince Edward County schools 
while public schools in all the other counties were being maintained 
denied the petitioners and the class of Negro students they represent the 
equal protection of the laws guaranteed by,the Fourteenth Amendment" 
(Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward County. 377 U.S. 225, 
1964).
Recognizing the deliberate efforts of Prince Edward County officials 
to circumvent the holdings of the two Brown decisions, the Court said that 
the time for mere "deliberate speed" has run out, and that phrase can 
no longer justify denying these Prince Edward County school children 
their constitutional rights to an education equal to that afforded 
by the public schools in the other parts of Virginia. (Griffin v. 
County School Board of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 234, 1964)
Green v. County School Board of Hew Kent County. 391 U.S. 430 (1968). 
The New Kent County school system operated two schools, one on the east 
side and one on the west side of New Kent County, Virginia. Approximately
one-half of the county's population was black, but there was no residential 
segregation, members of both races residing throughout the county. In 
spite of the decisions of Brown I and Brown II in 1954 and 1955, the New 
Kent County school board continued to racially segregate students. Each 
school served the whole county, and twenty-one buses traveled overlapping 
routes to transport students to their designated school. In 1965, the 
board, in order to remain eligible for federal financial aid, adopted a 
Hfreedom-of-choice" plan for desegregating the schools. The plan permitted 
students, except those entering the first and eighth grades, to choose 
annually between schools. Those not stating their choice were assigned to 
the school they had previously attended. First and eighth graders were 
required to make a definite choice between the two schools. During the 
first three years of the "freedom-of-choice" plan no white student had 
chosen to attend the all-black school, and although 115 blacks had enrolled 
in the formerly all-white school, eighty-five percent of the black 
students in the district still attended the all-black school. The adequacy 
of the "freedom-of-choice" plan was challenged in this case.
The Court ruled that the New Kent hfreedom-of-choice" was unacceptable 
because it had not resulted in the "racially nondiscriminatory school 
system" called for in Brown II. Although the Court did not go so far in 
this case as to declare "freedom-of-choice" plans unconstitutional, it did 
express that experience had indicated that it was an ineffective tool for 
desegregation and suggested other alternatives for complying with the Brown 
decisions.
The burden is on a school board to provide a plan that promises
realistically to work now, and a plan that at this late date fails to
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provi.de a meaningful assurance of prompt and effective 
disestablishment of a dual system is intolerable. (Green v. County 
School Board of New Kent County.. 391 U.S. 430, 1968)
In the opinion of the Court, a "freedom-of-choice" plan offered 
little promise that the required unitary, nonsegregated school system 
would be established. New, effective desegregation plans needed to be 
established without further delay so that the Fourteenth Amendment's 
requirement of equal protection of the laws for the black students could 
be met.
Zirkel (1978b) claimed that the Green case set the stage for a new 
era in school desegregation.
It was in Green that the Court first adopted the percentage of black- 
white students attending a given school as the primary measurement 
of whether a desegregation plan had been effective in achieving a 
unitary, nonracial school system. But instead of reducing the number 
of desegregation cases, the Green decision actually increased the 
litigation as school systems began to avail themselves of the 
apparent loopholes left by that decision. These loopholes included 
the failure of the Court to define what a working desegregation plan 
would entail and the failure to specify what a unitary school system 
was. The ambiguity surrounding these two points generated confusion 
and further litigation, (p. 75)
Beginning with the Green decision the Supreme Court became more actively 
involved in the desegregation process.
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United States v. Montgomery County Board of Education, 395 U.S. 225 
(1969). From 1964 to 1968, the local District Court judge had worked to 
push the Montgomery County, Alabama Board of Education to achieve racial 
desegregation of the county's schools. Since the Montgomery County Board 
of Education had taken no steps to integrate the public schools in the 
ten years after the Brown I decision, the courts intervened.
Obviously voluntary integration by the local school officials in 
Montgomery had not proved to be even partially successful. 
Consequently, if Negro children of school age were to receive their 
constitutional rights as we had declared them to exist, the coercive 
assistance of courts was imperatively called for. (United States v . 
Montgomery County Board of Education, 395 U.S. 228, 1969)
In 1964 the District Court judge began to offer this “coercive 
assistance.n In his initial order the judge required integration of 
certain grades and followed this with annual proceedings, including reports 
by the school board and hearings, opinions, and court orders. One of the 
provisions of the District Court judge's 1968 order dealt with faculty 
and staff desegregation. The judge ordered the nonracial allocation of 
faculty and staff with fixed mathematical ratios throughout the Bystem.
It was this reliance on mathematical ratios which the school board 
challenged.
Citing the Montgomery County school board's history of noncompliance 
and delay in creating a "system of public education freed of racial 
discrimination" as required in Brown II, the Court upheld the order of 
the District Court judge requiring fixed mathematical ratios. Praising 
the patience and wisdom of the judge, the Court concluded:
92
"Judge Johnson's order now before us was adopted in the spirit of this 
Court's opinion in Green v. County School Board, . . .  in that his plan 
'promises realistically to work, and promises realistically to work 
now111 (United States v. Montgomery County Board of Education, 395 U.S.
235, 1969). The Brown decision required the establishment of unitary 
school systems. The Court held that the nonracial assignment of faculty 
and staff is an acceptable method of satisfying that requirement,
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971). 
In the 1968-69 school year the Charlotte-Mecklenburg school system had 
more than 84,000 students. Approximately twenty-nine percent of these 
students were black. Despite a desegregation plan, adopted by the school 
board and approved by the District Court and which was based on 
geographic zoning of attendance,zones with a free-transfer provision, the 
schools remained largely segregated. In 1968 petitioner Swann moved for 
further relief based on the Green requirement that school boards "come 
forward with a plan that promises realistically to work, and promises 
realistically to work now."
When the school board failed to produce a satisfactory plan, one was 
imposed by the District Court. This plan relied upon zoning, pairing, 
and grouping techniques whereby several outlying elementary schools were 
grouped with each black inner city school in order to achieve a more 
acceptable racial balance. For the high schools and junior high schools, 
simple restructuring of school attendance zones achieved the racial 
balance sought. The implementation of the plan required extensive busing. 
The plan also required that as far as practicable, the schools ought to
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reflect the seventy-one to twenty-nine white-to-black student ratio of 
the district. In this case the school board challenged the District 
Court's plan, contending that it was unreasonable and too burdensome.
Reiterating its holding of Brown I# the Supreme Court declared that 
segregation of public schools on the basis of race constitutes a 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Supreme Court declared in their holding in this case that when school 
authorities default in their obligation to provide acceptable remedies, 
the district courts have broad powers to fashion remedies that will assure 
unitary school systems. That power includes: (1) the prerogative to
order that teachers be assigned in such a fashion that a certain degree 
of faculty desegregation is achieved; (2) the right to forbid patterns of 
school construction and abandonment which serve to perpetuate or 
re-establish a dual system; (3) the right to impose mathematical ratios 
and racial quotas as a starting point in shaping a desegregation plan;
(4) the right to alter school attendance zones, including the grouping 
and pairing of noncontiguous zones, to achieve desegregation; and (5) the 
right to require busing of students to a school not closest to the 
students' hones in order to achieve desegregation.
Mr. Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion of the Court:
The objective today remains to eliminate from the public schools all 
vestiges of state-imposed segregation. Segregation was the evil 
struck down by Brown I as. contrary to the equal protection guarantees 
of the Constitution. That was the violation sought to ,be corrected 
by the remedial measures of Brown II. That was the basis for the
holding in Green that school authorities are "clearly charged with 
the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to 
convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be 
eliminated root and branch."
If school authorities fail in their affirmative obligations under 
these holdings, judicial authority may be invoked. Once a right and 
a violation have been shown, the scope of a district court's 
equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad, for breadth and 
flexibility are inherent in.equitable remedies. (Swann v. Charlotte- 
Mecklenburg Board of Education. 402 U.S. 15, 1971)
Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973). A Mississippi statutory 
program, begun In 1940, had provided textbooks to students in both public 
and private schools without reference to whether any participating private 
school had racially discriminatory policies. Under the Mississippi 
program, the state purchased the textbooks then loaned them to the 
schools in the state. Between 1963 and 1970, the number of private, 
nonsectarian schools in Mississippi increased from seventeen to 155 and 
enrollment in such schools increased from 2362 to approximately 42,000.
It was apparent that the creation and growth of these private schools was 
a direct response to the mandate to desegregate the public school systems 
of Mississippi.
Hhile reaffirming their opinion that private schools have the right 
to exist and operate, the Supreme Court in this case denied that the Bqual 
Protection Clause requires the state to provide assistance to private 
schools.
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A State's special interest in elevating the quality of education in 
both public and private schools does not mean that the State must 
grant aid to private schools without regard to constitutionally 
mandated standards forbidding state-supported discrimination. That 
the Constitution may compel toleration of private discrimination in
some circumstances does not mean that it requires state support for
such discrimination. (Norwood v. Harrison. 413 U.S. 462-463, 1973) 
The Court also decreed that free textbooks, like tuition grants to 
students in private schools, were a form of financial assistance which 
benefited the schools themselves. By providing tangible aid in the form 
of free textbooks to schools which engage in racially discriminatory 
practices, the state gives support to discrimination. "Racial 
discrimination in state-operated schools is barred by the Constitution"
. . . (Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 465, 1973). The Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the state from granting 
tangible, specific financial aid to private, segregated schools.
Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976). Two black children applied 
for admission to private, nonsectarian schools and were subsequently 
denied admission solely on the basis of race. In this case, the children 
challenged the private schools' practice of racial discrimination as 
being counter to Title 42 U.S.C. section 1981. Title 42 U.S.C. section 
1981, as part of the Civil Rights Act of.1866, provides that "all persons 
within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the .same right in 
every state . . .  to make and enforce-contracts . . .  as is enjoyed by 
white citizens .
The principal issue in this case was whether section 1981 prohibits 
private schools from refusing admission to otherwise qualified children 
solely because they are black, and if so, whether that federal law is 
constitutional as so applied. The Court answered in the affirmative to 
both parts of the question. According to the interpretation of the 
Supreme Court, section 1981 "prohibits private, comnercially operated, 
nonsectarian schools from denying admission to prospective students 
because they are Negroes" (Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 161, 1976). The 
federal law expressly prohibits racial discrimination in the making and 
enforcing of private contracts, and the racial discrimination practiced 
by the two schools amounted to a "classic violation" of section 1981.
The parents of the two black children sought to enter into contractual 
arrangements with the schools, but "neither school offered services on an 
equal basis to white and nonwhite students" (Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 
172-173, 1976).
The Court also concluded that section 1981, as applied in this case, 
does not violate the constitutionally protected rights of free association 
and privacy, or a parent's right to direct the education of his children. 
It may be assumed that parents have a right to send their children 
to schools that promote the belief that racial segregation is
desirable, and that the children have a right to attend such schools,
[but] it does not follow that the practice of excluding racial 
minorities from such schools is also protected by the same principle.
(Runvon v. McCrary. 427 U.S. 161, 1976)
Lau v. Hichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974). This class action was brought 
by non-Ehglish-speaking Chinese students against officials responsible 
for the operation of the San Francisco school system. The California 
Education Code calls for mastery of the English language by students in 
California schools, but about 1000 Chinese-speaking students were 
receiving no remedial English language instruction nor any other 
compensatory program. This class of students claimed that the 
San Francisco school board denied them opportunity to participate in the 
public educational program. The Chinese-speaking students alleged that 
the school board's failure to provide them with an equal educational 
opportunity violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Section 601 
prohibits recipients of federal financial assistance from discriminating 
against students on the basis of race, color, or national origin. The 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare had authority to promulgate 
regulations to safeguard the provisions of section 601. In 1968 the 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare issued a guideline which 
stated that "^sjchool systems are responsible for assuring that students 
of a particular race, color, or national origin are not denied the 
opportunity to obtain the education generally obtained by other students 
in the system" (33 Federal Register 4956). A 1970 HEW guideline was more 
to the point!
Where inability to speak and understand the English language excludes 
national origin-minority group children from effective participation 
in the educational program offered by a school district, the district 
muBt take affirmative steps to rectify the language deficiency in
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order to open its instructional program to these students. (35
Federal Register 11595)
The Court determined that the failure to provide non-English-speaking 
students with special instruction denied them a meaningful opportunity to 
participate in the public education program and thus violated section 601 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the HEW regulations and guidelines.
The Court did not decide whether the school system* s failure to provide 
such a program violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteehth 
Amendment. "A school district receiving federal aid must provide special 
instruction for non-English-speaking students whose education is severely 
hampered by the language barrier, at least when there are substantial 
numbers of such students within the district" {Zirkel, 1978b, p. 98).
Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, Cohen v. Chesterfield County 
School Board. 414 U.S. 632 (1974). Pregnant public school teachers brought 
action in these companion cases challenging the mandatory maternity leave 
rules of the Cleveland, Ohio, and Chesterfield County, Virginia, school 
boards. The Cleveland rule required a pregnant teacher to take unpaid 
maternity leave five months before the expected birth, with application 
for leave to be made at least two weeks prior to her departure. A teacher 
on maternity leave was not eligible .to return to work until the beginning 
of the next regular semester after her child was three months old. A 
physician's certificate of physical fitness was also required prior to 
her return to work.
The Chesterfield County rule .required pregnant teachers to leave work 
at least four months prior to the expected birth, with notice to be given
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at least six months before the anticipated birth. Return to work was 
guaranteed no later than the first day of the school year after the date 
she presented a physician's certificate of fitness.
The Court held that the mandatory termination provisions of both 
school systems violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The school boards argued that their rules were necessary for two reasons: 
to maintain continuity of instruction and to assure that students have a 
physically capable instructor in the classroom.
Thus, while the advance-notice provisions in the Cleveland and 
Chesterfield County rules are wholly rational and may well be 
necessary to serve the objective of continuity of instruction, the 
absolute requirements of termination at the end of the fourth or 
fifth month of pregnancy are not. (Cleveland Board of Education v. 
LaFleur. 414 U.S. 642, 1974)
Recognizing that the mandatory germination provisions of the two 
school systems1 rules were designed to protect students from potentially 
incapacitated pregnant teachers, the Court felt that the rules swept too 
broadly,
for the provisions amount to a conclusive presumption that every 
pregnant teacher who reaches the fifth or sixth month of pregnancy 
is physically incapable of continuing . . . .  The rules contain an 
irrebuttable presumption of physical incompetency, and that 
presumption applies even when the medical evidence as to an 
individual woman's physical status might be wholly to the contrary. 
(Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur. 414 U.S. 644, 1974)
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The Court also concluded that Cleveland's provisions that the teacher 
was not eligible to return to work until her child reached an age of three 
months violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Such 
a rule, the Court said, is arbitrary and irrational. The Chesterfield 
County return rule was found to be permissible..
Vorchelmer v. School District of Philadelphia. 532 2d 880 (3d Circuit 
1976). A female high school student who had been denied admission to an 
all-male academic high school because of her gender challenged the 
constitutionality of her rejection. The Philadelphia school district 
offers two types of college preparatory programs: comprehensive and
academic. The comprehensive high schools provide a wide range of courses, 
including those required for college admission. The only criterion for 
enrollment in the comprehensive schools is residence within a designated 
zone. All but three of Philadelphia's comprehensive schools are 
coeducational. There are only two academic high schools in the city of 
Philadelphia. These have high admission standards (only seven percent of 
the students in the city qualify) and serve the whole city. One of the 
two academic schools enrolls only male students, the other only female 
studentB. Enrollment at these schools is strictly voluntary. The two 
academic schools are conparable in quality and offer essentially equal 
educational opportunities.
The plaintiff argued that the school district’s refusal to admit her 
to the all-male academic high school was in violation of the Equal 
Education Opportunities Act of 1974 and of the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. The decision rendered by the Court of Appeals,
101
which decision the United States Supreme Court affirmed, stated:
Where record disclosed no inequality in opportunity for education 
between two public high schools^ one of which had exclusively male 
students and the other of which had exclusively female students, 
policy declaration of Equal Education Opportunities Act that children 
are entitled to "equal educational opportunity" without regard to 
race, color, or sex was inapplicable and did not require finding 
that maintenance of two sex-segregated public high schools was 
contrary to public policy. fVorcheimer v. School District of 
Philadelphia, 532, 2d 880, 3d Circuit 1976)
In response to the claim that the plaintiff had been denied equal 
protection of the laws, the Court of Appeals answered:
Where attendance at either of two sex-segregated public high schools 
was voluntary and educational opportunities offered at the two 
schools were essentially equal and where the school system was 
otherwise coeducational, public school system's regulations which 
established admission requirements to the two high schools based on 
gender classification did not offend the equal protection clause 
of the United States Constitution. (Vorcheimer v. School District of 
Philadelphia. 532, 2d 880, 3d Circuit 1976)
School District Finance and Organization
The Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that 
powers not delegated to the federal government by the Constitution are 
reserved to the states. Because‘education is not mentioned in the 
Constitution, it is generally assumed, then, to be a state power. State
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legislatures have exercised this power by organizing and financing a 
system of free public schools. With few exceptions the United States 
Supreme Court has extended broad powers to the states in matters of 
school district finance and organization. The Supreme Court has concluded 
that it is indeed within a state's power to establish and operate a 
system of free public education. In those few instances where the court 
has struck down a state's educational policy, the issue has centered on 
the Constitutional question of equal protection of the laws. In these 
cases, the Court has held that the rights of a class of individuals to 
equal protection of the laws, as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, 
supersede the states' right to organize and finance the public school 
systems.
Attorney General of the State of Michigan ex rel. Kies v. Lowrey.
199 U.S. 233 <1905). The constitution of the state of Michigan requires 
the legislature to establish and provide a system of public education.
In accordance with this requirement the legislature passed laws establishing 
school districts. In this case, a law enacted in 1881 established four 
school districts in Somerset and Moscow townships of Hillsdale County.
In 1901, new legislation incorporated portions of the four original 
districts to create a new district. The defendants challenged the 
validity of the act creating the new district. The question to be 
resolved by the Court was: Does the legislature have the authority to
alter school district boundaries? The defendants argued that the 
Constitutional guarantees of republican government {Article IV, section 4},
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of the unimpaired right of contracts (Article I, section 10), and of the 
due process of the laws in protecting property rights (Amendment Fourteen) 
had been violated.
The Court ruled that "the legislature of the state has absolute 
power to make and change subordinate municipalities," (Attorney General - 
of the State of Michigan ex rel. Kies v. Lowrey. 26 S.Ct, 29, 1905), 
including school districts. In answering the arguments of the defendants, 
the Court stated:
If the legislature of the state has the power to create and alter 
school districts, and divide and apportion the property of such 
district, no contract can arise, no property of a district can be
said to be taken, and the action of the legislature is compatable
with a republican form of government . . . ." (Attorney General of 
the State of Michigan ex rel. Kies v. Lowrev. 26 S.Ct. 29, 1905)
State of Montana ex rel. Haire v. Rice, 204 U.S. 291 (1907). An act 
approved by the United States Congress in 1889 admitted Montana and 
several other states into the Union. Among the provisions of this 
enabling act was the granting of public lands to the state of Montana 
solely for the purpose of public education. The people of the territory 
about to become a state were required to select delegates to a convention 
charged with the responsibility of creating a state constitution and 
government.
The state constitution approved at this constitutional convention 
"in substance provided that all funds of the state institutions of learning
should be invested and only the interest upon them used for the support of
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those institutions . . . "  (State of Montana ex rel. Halre V. Rice. 27 
S.Ct. 284, 1907). In 1905 the state legislature authorized a bond issue 
to subsidize an addition to the state's normal school building. These 
bonds were to be secured by proceeds from the sale, lease, or exploitation 
of the lands that had been granted to Montana by the federal government 
for the support of the schools.
When the architect of the building addition sought to be paid for 
his services from the proceeds of the bond issue, the State Treasurer 
refused to pay him claiming that the bond issue secured by proceeds from 
the sale or lease of school lands was in violation of the state's 
constitutional requirement that only earned interest be used to support 
the schools of the state. Litigation followed the State Treasurer's 
refusal.
Affirming the judgment of the Supreme Court of Montana, the United 
States Supreme Court declared the bond act invalid because it was in 
violation of the Montana State Constitution. The Tenth Amendment provides 
that powers not specified as federal powers are reserved to the states.
One of the state's powers is its provision for public education. The Court 
determined that, in view of the Tenth Amendment, a state may properly 
limit the way in which federal grants of land to the state for the purpose 
of education may be used. The requirement of Montana's Constitution that 
only earned interest be expended in supporting the schools of the state 
is, therefore, permissible.
Kramer V. Union Free School District Mo. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969). A 
section of the New York Education Law provided that in certain school
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districts residents, otherwise eligible to vote, were prohibited from 
voting in school district elections if they did not own or lease taxable 
real property or have children attending the local public schools. A 
bachelor who neither owned or leased taxable property challenged the 
constitutionality of the section, arguing that it was counter to the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The school district 
argued that the state had a legitimate compelling interest in limiting 
the franchise in school district elections to those members of the 
community "primarily interested" in or "primarily affected" by school 
affairs.
The Supreme Court found the New York section to be a violation of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. Citing Williams v. Rhodes (1968), the Court 
said:
In determining whether or riot a state law violates the Equal 
Protection Clause, we must consider the facts and circumstances 
behind the law, the interests which the State claims .to be 
protecting, and the interest of those who are disadvantaged by 
the classification. (Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15,
395 U.S. 626, 1969)
In the present case the Court decided that although the state of New York 
did have a legitimate interest and the authority to enact laws relative 
to the operation of public schools, those laws must not deny any citizen 
of his constitutionally guaranteed rights.
Therefore, if a challenged state statute grants the right to vote to 
some bona fide residents of requisite age and citizenship and denies
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the franchise to others, the Court must determine whether the
exclusions are necessary to promote a compelling state interest.
(Kramer v. Union Free School District Mo. 15. 395 U.S. 627, 1969)
In this case the Court ruled that those exclusions were not "necessary to 
promote a compelling state interest."
The court also stated that while New York legitimately might limit 
the franchise to those "primarily interested in school affairs," the 
classifications of the section of the New York Education in question here
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did not accomplish that purpose "with sufficient precision to justify 
denying appellant and members of his class, since the classifications 
include many persons at best only remotely interested in school affairs 
and exclude others directly interested" (Kramer v. Union Free School 
District No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 1969).
Turner v. Pouche. 396 U.S. 346 (1970). Black residents of 
Taliaferro County, Georgia brought action to challenge the constitutionality 
of a statutory system used to .select juries and school boards. The system 
in question provided for a county, school board of five landowners, selected 
by a grand jury, which in turn was chosen from a jury list compiled by six 
county jury commissioners who were appointed by the state superior;court 
judge of that district. Although the population of Taliaferro County was 
about sixty percent black and although all students attending the county's 
two schools were black (all white students having transferred elsewhere), 
all the school board members were white. The complaint attacked Georgia's 
constitutional and statutory provisions for school board selection as 
contrary to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
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The Supreme Court decreed that the requirement that members of 
county school boards be landowners was unconstitutional because it denied 
equal protection of the laws. In the opinion of the Court,
the appellants and the members of their class do have a federal 
constitutional right to be considered for public service without the 
burden of invidious discriminatory disqualifications. The State may 
not deny to some the privilege of holding public office that it 
extends to others on the basis of distinctions that violate federal 
constitutional guarantees. (Turner v. Fouche. 396 U.S. 362-363, 1970)
Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1 (1971). The Constitution of West Virginia 
and certain West Virginia statutes require sixty percent voter approval of 
measures which incur bonded indebtedness or increase tax rates beyond 
those established by the Constitution. The school board of Roane County, 
West Virginia, submitted to the voters of. that county a proposal calling 
for the issuance of general obligation bonds for the purpose of 
constructing new school buildings and improving existing facilities. By 
separate ballot, the voters were also asked to authorize the Board of 
Education to levy additional taxes to support current expenditures and 
capital improvements. Both proposals were defeated because they failed 
to obtain the required sixty percent approval. Respondents sought to 
have the sixty percent requirement declared unconstitutional as violative 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Even though West Virginia has made it more difficult for some kinds 
of governmental actions to be taken,'" . . . there is nothing in the 
language of the Constitution, our history, or our cases that requires that
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majority always prevail on every isBue" {Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 6*
1971)• The Court concluded that "so long as such provisions do not 
discriminate against or authorize discrimination against any identifiable 
class they do not violate the Equal Protection Clause" (Gordon v. Lance. 
403 U.S. 7, 1971).
Mclnnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327 {1968). In Mclnnls v. Oqilvic, 
a precursor to the widely publicized Rodriquez case, the Court affirmed 
the decision of the District Court upholding the constitutionality of a 
state system of funding public schools that relies heavily on the local 
property tax. In the Mclnnis case, heard on the District Court level as 
Mclnnls v. Shapiro (1968), a number of students from four school districts 
of Cook County, Illinois, alleged that the Illinois system of financing 
public education violated their Fourteenth Amendment rights of due 
process and equal protection of the laws. The students claimed that the 
Illinois system permitted wide variations in the expenditures per student 
from district to district, thereby providing some students with a better 
education than others.
The Illinois legislature had delegated authority to local school 
districts to raise funds to operate their schools by levying a tax on 
property and by issuing bonds for construction and improvement of 
buildings. (Legislation also limits both the maximum indebtedness and 
the maximum tax rates that school boards may impose.) Because the 
financial ability of individual districts varied substantially there was 
a wide variation in district per-pupil expenditures. However, a state
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common school fund guaranteed each district a foundation level of 400 
dollars per pupil and thus provided a minimum level of education funding.
While admitting that there were, indeed, inequalities in per-pupil 
expenditures from district to district, the District Court failed to 
find the Illinois statutory system unconstitutional. Failing to find the 
wide variations in per-pupil expenditures to be irrational and arbitrary, 
the District Court ruled that the system did not violate due process; and 
failing to find that the system constituted an invidious discrimination, 
the District Court held that the system did not deny the equal 
protection of the laws to any class of students.
The District Court thus ruled that a state system for funding public 
schools that relies largely on local property taxation is constitutional. 
The Supreme Court summarily affirmed the lower court's decision by an 
eight-to-one vote. In ruling that the Illinois system did not violate 
Fourteenth Amendment rights the District Court concluded its opinion as 
follows:
The present Illinois scheme for financing public education reflects 
a rational policy consistent with 'the mandate of the Illinois 
Constitution. Unequal educational expenditures per student, based 
upon the variable property values and tax rates of local school 
districts, do not amount to an invidious discrimination. Moreover, 
the statutes which permit these unequal expenditures on a district 
to district basis are neither arbitrary nor unreasonable.
There is no-Constitutional requirement that public school expenditures 
be made only on the basis of pupils' educational needs without regard 
to the financial strength of local school districts. Nor does the
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Constitution establish the rigid guideline of equal dollar 
expenditures for each student. (Mclnnis v. Shapiro. 293 P. Supp.
336, 1968)
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1 
(1973). The financing of public elementary and secondary schools in Texas 
is based on mutual participation by state and local agencies. Nearly half 
of the revenues expended for education are derived from the state*s 
Minimum Foundation Program which is designed to provide a basic minimum 
education for all children in the state. As a unit the school districts 
in the state contribute twenty percent of the revenues for this program 
which is then returned to the school districts under a formula designed 
to have an equalizing influence on expenditure levels between school 
districts. Every school district in Texas supplements its state aid 
through an ad valorem tax on property in its district. This revenue 
source varies with the value of taxable property in the district and 
results in wide variations in per-pupil expenditures among school 
districts.
Appellees brought this class action on behalf of school children 
said to be members of poor families who reside in school districts 
having a low property tax base, making the claim that the Texas 
system's reliance on local property taxation favors the more 
affluent and violates equal protection requirements because of 
substantial interdistrict disparities in per-pupil expenditures 
resulting primarily from differences in the value of assessable
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property among the districts. (San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriquez. 411 U.S. 1, 1973)
The United States Supreme Court has consistently maintained that the 
Bjual Protection Clause requires "strict judicial scrutiny" of any 
statute which operates to the disadvantage of any suspect class of persons 
or interferes with the exercise of rights and liberties protected by the 
Constitution. The District Court found wealth to be a suspect 
classification and education to be a fundamental right. That court 
concluded that the Texas system of funding education could be sustained 
only if the state could show that its program was based on a "compelling 
state interest." When the state faiied to demonstrate a compelling 
interest in its system of funding public education, the District Court 
declared the Texas school finance system unconstitutional under the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The state appealed to the 
United States Supreme Court.
By a five-to-four margin, the United States Supreme Court reversed 
the opinion of the District Court. Finding neither the suspect- 
classification nor the fundamehtal-interest arguments convincing, the 
Supreme Court declared the Texas funding system permissible. In the 
opinion of the Court: "The Texas system does not disadvantage any suspect
class. It has not been shown to discriminate against any definable class 
of 'poor1 people or to occasion discriminations depending on the relative 
wealth of the families in any district" (San Antonio Independent School 
District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 2, 1973).
Likewise, there was no loss of a fundamental right, as the appellees 
claimed, because education is not constitutionally protected and since
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at least a minimum education is provided to each student in the state.
The question which the Supreme Court asked in evaluating the contention 
that the Texas funding system denied a fundamental right wasr Does the 
Constitution, either explicitly or implicitly, guarantee a right to 
education? The Court answered their question in this manner: "Education,
of course, is not among the rights afforded explicit protection under our 
Federal Constitution. Nor do we find any basis for saying it is implicitly 
so protected" {San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriquez.
411 U.S. 35, 1973). In its concluding remarks, the Court stated that the 
Texas funding system was rationally related to a "legitimate state purpose 
or interest" and therefore satisfied the standards of the Equal Protection 
Clause.
Summary
To the extent that the number and the scope of cases involving 
educational issues decided by the United States Supreme Court has increased 
in the past thirty years, so has educators' need to know. Various 
authorities in the field of school law have expressed the opinion that 
educators have failed to prepare themselves for the legal realities of 
their profession. McCarthy, Leipold and Rousch, Nolte, Hazard, Gatti and 
Gatti, Van Geel, Simpson, and Campbell have all stated that ignorance 
of the law is inexcusable and that measures need to be taken to rectify 
the existing situation.
Five areas of Supreme Court decisions affecting education were 
identified in this study: student rights and responsibilities; employee
rights and responsibilities; church and state relationships; race,
language, and sex discrimination; and school district finance and 
organization. In each of these five areas, a number of United States 
Supreme Court decisions were discussed. Although the decisions discussed 
in this review of literature are by no means exhaustive, it is presumed 
that those presented do constitute a reasonable sampling of the decisions 
about which those involved in education ought to be knowledgeable.
CHAPTER 3 
Research Design and Procedures
Introduction
This chapter contains a description of the research design, the 
selection of the sample, the instrument, and the procedures followed in 
data collection and statistical analysis.
Research Design
The techniques of descriptive research, sometimes known as survey 
research, were used in this study. Descriptive research attempts to 
systematically describe the facts and characteristics of a given 
population (Isaac and Michael, 1990). Descriptive research is concerned 
with describing the prevailing conditions of relationships that exist.
It is mainly concerned with the present circumstances and not with past 
or future conditions (Best, 1977). In the present study the prevailing 
condition under examination was the amount of knowledge of Supreme Court 
decisions affecting education possessed by public school teachers, 
principals, superintendents, and board members in Tennessee.
The specific type of descriptive research used in the present study 
was survey testing. Survey testing is defined as “simply the testing of 
a group of children (or adults) to ascertain the prevailing condition 
with respect to the traits measured by the test" (Good, Barr, and 
Scates, 1941, p. 297). Such testing is not concerned with the 
characteristics of respondents individually but with the generalized
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statistics which result from study of the entire group (Good et al.,
1941 and Best, 1977).
Selection of the Sample
The purpose of this study was to determine the amount of knowledge 
of United States Supreme Court decisions affecting education possessed 
by public school teachers, principals, superintendents, and board members 
in Tennessee; to determine if significant differences existed among these 
groups in terms of their knowledge of Supreme Court decisions affecting 
education; to determine if significant differences existed in the 
knowledge of Supreme Court decisions among members of each group 
depending on their years of experience in education; and to determine if 
significant differences existed in the knowledge of Supreme Court 
decisions among members of each group, depending on their level of 
education. In order to accomplish this purpose the four subgroups in 
the sample were public school teachers, principals, superintendents, and 
board members in Tennessee. The technique of random sampling was used 
to assure adequate representation of the population. The population 
consisted of the public school teachers, principals, superintendents, and 
board members of public school districts in Tennessee.
Tennessee State Department of Education officials provided assistance 
in selecting the sample of public school teachers, principals, and 
superintendents. Tennessee School Boards Association officials provided 
assistance in selecting the sample of school board members surveyed in the 
study. One hundred principals, one hundred superintendents, one hundred
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board members, and two hundred teachers were randomly selected for 
participation in the study.
Instrumentation
Development of the Instrument
The instrument. Supreme Court Decisions Impacting on Education 
(Appendix C), was developed for the purpose of determining the amount of 
knowledge of Supreme Court decisions affecting education possessed by 
public school teachers, principals, superintendents, and board members.
The instrument was designed to elicit information concerning their 
knowledge of the holdings of the United States Supreme Court. The Supreme 
Court Decisions Inpacting on Education instrument consisted of thirty-five 
items. Each of these items was identified as belonging to one of five 
separate categories of Supreme Court decisions affecting education. These 
categories were as follows: (1) student rights and responsibilities;
(2) employee rights and responsibilities; (3) church and state 
relationships; (4} race, language, and sex discrimination; and (5) school 
district finance and organization.
The Supreme Court Decisions Impacting on Education instrument asked 
respondents to indicate whether the United States Supreme Court had 
mandated ("must"), permitted ("may"), or prohibited ("must not") a 
particular educational practice or procedure. A fourth alternative was 
provided ("don't know") for respondents who were unfamiliar with the 
decision of the Court on a particular item. These multiple-choice 
statements were formulated on the basis of a review and analysis of the 
literature. Basic statements of decisions rendered by the Supreme Court
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were compiled into the survey instrument. The format of the Supreme 
Court Decisions Impacting on Education instrument was suggested by 
Perry A. Zirkel (Zirkel, 1978a and 1978c). Permission to use Zirkel1s 
format was sought and received (see Appendix A).
Validation of the Instrument
The survey instrument was pilot tested by two groups of graduate 
students at East Tennessee State University majoring in educational 
administration and supervision during the summer of 1983. Recommendations 
concerning superfluous, inconsistent, or ambiguous statements were 
solicited. Recommendations and suggestions for improvement were 
incorporated into the survey instrument. By means of this pilot test, 
the Supreme Court Decisions Impacting on Education instrument was accepted 
as valid for the purposes of this study. A copy of the survey instrument 
is included in Appendix B.
Procedures
Data Collection
Once approval was granted by the advanced graduate committee to 
pursue the study, the Supreme Court Decisions Impacting on Education 
instrument was mailed to the randomly selected san%>le of public school 
teachers, principals, superintendents, and board members. Along with 
the instrument each participant received a cover letter explaining the 
procedures for completing the instrument (see Appendix C ]. Individual 
confidentiality was assured. A stamped, self-addressed envelope was 
provided for the participant to return the completed instrument. Four
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weeks after the initial mailing a follow-up letter was sent to those 
subjects who had not responded (see Appendix D). Four weeks later data 
from the returned instruments were prepared for statistical analysis.
Statistical Analysis
For the purpose of statistical treatment the null farm of each 
research hypothesis was tested. The null hypothesis postulates that 
there is no significant difference or relationship between the variables 
under analysis (Popham and Sirotnik, 1973). "The null hypothesis is a 
succinct way to express the testing of obtained data against chance 
expectations" (Kerlinger, 1973, p. 203).
One-way analysis of variance and the Newman-Keuls procedure were 
the statistical techniques utilized in testing the hypotheses in this 
study. Analysis of variance is an inferential technique used to determine 
if three or more means are significantly different. Because analysis of 
variance does not reveal where specific differences may lie among several 
means, special post hoc tests are required (Champion, 1976). In this 
study the Newman-Keuls post hoc procedure was used to determine where 
specific differences existed. The .05 level of significance was used in 
this study for determining statistical significance,.
CHAPTER 4
An Analysis of the Findings of the Study 
Introduction
The purpose of this study was to determine the knowledge of United 
States Supreme Court decisions affecting education possessed by public 
school teachers, principals, superintendents, and board membersj to 
determine if significant differences existed among these groups in terms 
of their knowledge of Supreme court decisions affecting education; to 
determine if significant differences existed in the knowledge of Supreme 
Court decisions among members of each group, depending on their years of 
experience in education; and to determine if significant differences 
existed in the knowledge of Supreme Court decisions among members of each 
group, depending on their level of education. Fourteen hypotheses were 
tested using the analysis of variance and Newman-Keuls procedures. The 
analysis of variance procedure indicated whether differences did, in fact, 
exist; the Newman-Keuls procedure indicated where the identified > 
differences lay.- The null form of each of the fourteen hypotheses was 
tested at the .05 level of significance. Details of the findings are 
presented in the following sections.
Analysis of the Findings 
A total of 500 subjects was included in the san$>le which consisted 
of two hundred teachers, one hundred principals, one hundred superintendents, 
and one hundred school board members. All subjects were affiliated with a
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public school system in the state of Tennessee. Eighty-five teachers, 
fifty-three principals, sixty-four superintendents, and thirty-nine 
board members returned usable instruments. A total of 241, or 48.2 
percent, usable instruments were returned. Table 1 presents the 
preceding information in tabular form.
Table 1
Number and Percent of Returned Responses
Position
Number
Sent
Number
Returned Percent
Teacher 200 85 42.5
Principal 100 53 53.0
Superintendent 100 64 64.0
Board Member 100 39 39.0
Total 500 241 . 48.2
There were seven questions on the survey instrument which were 
designed to measure respondents' knowledge about Supreme Court decisions 
affecting education in the area of student rights and responsibilities. 
Means and standard deviations for the four groups and for the entire 
sample in the area of Btudent rights and responsibilities are presented 
in Table 2.
N
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Table 2
Keans and Standard Deviations for Respondents' Knowledge of
Supreme court Decisions in the Area of
Student Rights and Responsibilities
Position N Mean
Standard
Deviation
Teacher 85 3.3294 1.5227
Principal 53 3.8491 1.4464
Superintendent 64 4.1094 1.6438
Board Member 39 2.8462 1.3676
Entire Sample 241 3.5726 1.5719
Null Hypothesis 1
Null Hypothesis 1 states that there will be no significant difference 
among public school teachers, principals, superintendents, and board 
members in the knowledge demonstrated about United States Supreme Court 
decisions affecting education in the area of student rights and 
responsibilities.
The results of the analysis of variance statistical procedure for 
Null Hypothesis 1 are presented in Table 3. The F ratio was 6.9737 with 
F probability being 0.0002 which Was less than the .05 level of 
significance. Therefore, a significant difference was found, and the null 
hypothesis was rejected.
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Table 3
Analysis of Variance for Respondents’ Knowledge of Supreme
Court Decisions in the Area of Student Rights and
Responsibilities
Source of 
Variation
Degrees of 
Freedom
Sum of 
Squares
Mean
Squares
F
Ratio
F
Probability
Between Groups 3 48.0990 16.0330 6.9737 .0002*
Within Groups 237 544.8802 2.2991
Total ‘ 240 592.9793
*P ^  .05
Since the analysis of variance procedure revealed that there was a 
significant difference among the groups in the knowledge of Supremo Court 
decisions in the area of student rights and responsibilities, further 
analysis was conducted using the Newman-Keuls procedure. Superintendents 
scored significantly higher in the area of student rights and 
responsibilities than teachers and board members. Principals scored 
significantly higher than board members. No significant difference was 
found between Superintendents and principals, between principals and 
teachers, or between teachers and board members in the amount of knowledge 
demonstrated about United States Supreme Court decisions affecting 
education in the area of student rights and responsibilities. Results 
of the Newman-Keuls procedure are presented in Table 4.
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Table 4
Means and Mean Differences Between Groups in Their Knowledge of
Supreme Court Decisions in the Area of
Student Rights and Responsibilities
Group Group Means
GrouD Mean Differences
Teacher Principal Superintendent
Board Members 2.8462 0.4832 1.0029** 1.2632**
Teachers 3.3294 .5197 .7800*
Principal 3.8491 .2603
Superintendent 4.1094
*Significant at .05 level
** Significant at .01 level
There were eight questions on the survey instrument which were 
designed to measure respondents' knowledge about Supreme Court decisions 
affecting education in the area of employee rights and responsibilities. 
Means and standard deviations for the four groups and for the entire 
sample in the area of employee rights and responsibilities are presented 
in Table 5.
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Table 5
Means and Standard Deviations for Respondents' Knowledge of
Supreme Court Decisions in the Area of
Employee Rights and Responsibilities
Position N Mean
Standard
Deviation
Teacher 85 3.9882 1.7694
Principal 53 4.6981 1.4621
Superintendent 64 4.7500 1.6330
Board Member 39 4.5641 1.7441
Entire Sample 241 4.4398 1.6899
Mull Hypothesis 2
Null Hypothesis 2 states that there will be no significant difference 
among public school teachers, principals, superintendents, and board 
members in the knowledge demonstrated about United States Supreme Court 
decisions affecting education in the area of employee rights and 
responsibilities.
The results of the analysis of variance statistical procedure for 
Null Hypothesis 2 are presented in Table 6. The P ratio was 3.3185 with 
the F probability being 0.0206 which waB less than the .05 level of 
significance. Therefore, a significant difference was found, and the null 
hypothesis was rejected.
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Table 6
Analysis of Variance for Respondents' Knowledge of
Supreme Court Decisions in the Area of
Employee Rights and Responsibilities
Source of 
Variation
Degrees of 
Freedom
Sum of 
Squares
Mean
Square
F
Ratio
F
Probability
Between Groups 3 27.6298 9.2099 3.3185 .0206*
Within Groups ■ 237 657.7478 2.7753
Total 240 685.3776
* P .05
Since the analysis of variance procedure revealed that there was a 
significant difference among the groups in the knowledge of Supreme Court 
decisions in the area of employee rights and responsibilities, further 
analysis was conducted using the Newman-Keuls procedure. Superintendents 
and principals scored significantly higher in the area of employee rights 
and responsiblilities than teachers. No significant difference was found 
between superintendents and principals, between superintendents and board 
members, between principals and board members, or between board members 
and teachers in the amount of knowledge demonstrated about United States 
Supreme Court decisions affecting education in the area of employee 
rights and responsibilities. Results of the Newman-Keuls procedure are 
presented in Table 7.
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Table 7
Means and Mean Differences Between Groups in Their Knowledge of 
Supreme Court Decisions in the Area of 
Employee Bights and Responsibilities
Group Mean. Differences
Group Group Means Board Member Principal Superintendent
Teacher 3.9882 0.5759 0.7099* 0.7618*
Board Member 4.5641 0.1340 0.1859
Principal 4.6981 0.0519
Superintendent 4.7500
^Significant at .05 level
There were seven questions on the survey instrument which were 
designed to measure respondents’ knowledge about Supreme Court decisions 
affecting education in the area of church and state relationships. Means 
and standard deviations for the four groups and for the entire sample in 
the area of church and state relationships are presented in Table 8.
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Table 8
Moans and Standard Deviations for Respondents' Knowledge of
Supreme Court Decisions in the Area of
Church and State Relationships
Position N Mean
Standard
Deviation
Teacher 85 2.4588 1.2301
Principal 53 3.0189 1.3372
Superintendent 64 3.8906 1.5442
Board Member 39 2.1026 1.2311
Entire Sample 241 2.9046 1.4900
Null Hypothesis 3
Null Hypothesis 3 states that there will be no significant difference 
among public school teachers, principals, superintendents, and board 
members in the Knowledge demonstrated about United States Supreme Court 
decisions affecting education in the area of church and state relationships.
The results of the analysis of variance statistical procedure for Null 
Hypothesis 3 are presented in Table 9. The P ratio was 19.3653 with the F 
probability being 0.0000 which was less than the .05 level of significance. 
Therefore, a significant difference was found, and the null hypothesis was 
rejected.
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Table 9
Analysis of Variance for Respondents' Knowledge of
Supreme Court Decisions in the Area of
Churtih and State Relationships
Source of 
Variation
Degrees of 
Freedom
Sum of 
Squares
Mean
Squares
F
Ratio
F
Probability
Between Groups 3 104.8938 34.9646 19.3653 .0000*
Within Groups 237 427.9111 1.8055
Total 240
*P Z- .05
Since the analysis of variance procedure revealed that there was a 
significant difference among the groups in the knowledge of Supreme Court 
decisions in the area of church and state relationships, further analysis 
was conducted using the Newman-Keuls procedure. Superintendents scored 
significantly higher than teachers, principals, and board members. 
Principals scored significantly higher than teachers and board members.
No significant difference was found between teachers and board members 
in the amount of knowledge demonstrated about United States Supreme 
Court decisions affecting education in the area of church and state 
relationships. Results of the Newman-Keuls procedure are presented in 
Table 10.
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Table 10
Means and Mean Differences Between Groups in Their Knowledge of
Supreme Court Decisions in the Area of
Church and State Relationships
Group Mean Differences
Group Group Means Teacher Principal Superintendent
Board Member 2.1026 0.3562 0.9163** 1.7880**
Teacher 2.4588 0.5601* 1.4318**
Principal 3.0189 0.B717**
Superintendent 3.6906
♦Significant at .05 level 
♦♦Significant at ,01 level
There were eight questions on the survey instrument which were 
designed to measure respondents' knowledge about Supreme Court decisions 
affecting education in the area of race, language, and sex discrimination. 
Means and standard deviations for the four groups and for the entire 
sample in the area of race, language, and sex discrimination are presented 
in Table 11.
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Table 11
Means and Standard Deviations for Respondents' Knowledge of
Supreme Court Decisions in the Area of
Race, Language, and Sex Discrimination
Position N Mean
Standard
Deviation
Teacher 85 3.9412 1.7617
Principal 53 4.4906 1.5016
Superintendent 64 4.5469 1.6896
Board Member 39 3.8462 1.8287
Entire Sample 241 4.2075 1.7171
Null Hypothesis 4
Null Hypothesis 4 states that there will be no significant difference 
among public school teachers, principals, superintendents, and board 
members in the knowledge demonstrated about United States Supreme Court 
decisions affecting education in the area of race, language, and sex 
discrimination.
The results of the analysis of variance statistical procedure for Null 
Hypothesis 4 are presented in Table 12. The F ratio was 2.6229 with the 
F probability being 0.0513 which was greater than the .05 level of 
significance. Therefore, a significant difference was not found. Tho null 
hypothesis was not rejected. No two groups were significantly different 
at the .05 level.
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Table 12
Analysis of Variance for Respondents' Knowledge of
Supreme Court Decisions in the Area of
Race, Language, and Sex Discrimination
Source of 
Variation
Degrees of 
Freedom
Sum of 
Squares
Mean
Squares
F
Ratio
F
Probability
Between Groups 3 22.7391 7.5797 2.6229 0.0513
Within Groups 237 684.0875 2.8898
Total 240 707.6266
P i.05
There were five questions on the survey instrument which were 
designed to measure respondents' knowledge about Supreme Court decisions 
affecting education in the area of school district finance and organization. 
Means and standard deviations for the four groups and for the entire 
sanple in the area of school district finance and organization are 
presented in Table 13.
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Table 13
Means and Standard Deviations for Respondents' Knowledge of
Supreme Court Decisions in the Area of School
District Finance and Organization
Position N Mean
Standard
Deviation
Teacher 85 2.2941 1.3612
Principal 53 2.8491 1.1162
Superintendent 64 2.9531 1.4631
Board Member 39 2.7179 1.2763
Entire Sample 241 2.6598 1.3480
Null Hypothesis 5
Null Hypothesis 5 states that there will be no significant difference 
among public school teachers, principals, superintendents, and board 
members in the knowledge demonstrated about United States Supreme Court 
decisions affecting education in the area of school district finance and 
organization.
The results of the analysis of variance statistical procedure for 
Null Hypothesis 5 are presented in Table 14. The F ratio was 3.5795 
with the F probability being 0.0146 which was less than .05 level of 
significance. Therefore, a significant difference was found, and the null 
hypothesis was rejected.
133
Table 14
Analysis of Variance for Respondents' Knowledge of
Supreme Court Decisions in the Area of School
District Finance and Organization
Source of 
Variation
Degrees of 
Freedom
Sum of 
Squares
Mean
Squares
F
Ratio
F
Probability
Between Groups 3 18.9033 6.3011 3.5795 0.0146*
Within Groups 237 417.1963 1.7603
Total 240 436.0996
*P .05
Since the analysis of variance procedure revealed that there was a 
significant difference among the groups in the knowledge of Supreme court 
decisions in the area of school district finance and organization, further 
analysis was conducted using the Newman-Keuls procedure. Superintendents 
and principals scored significantly higher than teachers. No significant 
difference was found between superintendents and principals, between 
superintendents and board members, between principals and board members, 
or between board members and teachers in the amount of knowledge 
demonstrated about United States Supreme Court decisions affecting 
education in the area of school district finance and organization. Results 
of the Newman-Keuls procedure are presented in Table 15.
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Table 15
Means and Mean Differences Between Groups in Their Knowledge of
Supreme Court Decisions in the Area of School
District Finance and Organization
Group Mean Differences
Group Group Means Board Member Principal Superintendent
Teacher 2.2941 0.4238 0.5550* 0.6950*
Board Member 2.7179 0.1312 0.2352
Principal 2.B491 0.1040
Superintendent 2.9531
*Significant at .05 level
There was a total of thirty-five questions on the Supreme Court 
Decisions Impacting on Education instrument. Means and standard deviations 
for the four groups and for the entire sample are presented in Table 16.
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Table 16
Means and Standard Deviations for Respondents1
Overall Knowledge of Supreme Court
Decisions Affecting Education
Position N Mean
Standard
Deviation
Teacher 85 16.0118 5.1858
Principal 53 18.9057 4.5373
Superintendent 64 20.2500 5.3601
Board Member 39 16.0769 5.5221
Entire Sample 241 17.7842 5.4524
Null Hypothesis 6
Null Hypothesis 6 states that there will be no significant difference 
among public school teachers, principals, superintendents, and board 
members in the overall knowledge demonstrated about United States Supreme 
Court decisions affecting education.
The results of the analysis of variance statistical procedure for Null 
Hypothesis 6 are presented in Table 17. The F ratio was 10.4922 with the 
F probability being 0.0000 which was less than the .05 level of 
significance. Therefore, a significant difference was found, and the null 
hypothesis was rejected.
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Table 17
Analysis of Variance.for Respondents' Overall Knowledge 
of Supreme Court Decisions Affecting Education
Source of 
Variation
Degrees of 
Freedom
Sum of 
Squares
Mean
Squares
F
Ratio
F
Probability
Between Groups 3 836;4943 278.8413 10.4922 .0000*
within Groups 237 6298.2858 26.5750
Total 240 7134.7801
*P <  .05
Since the analysis of variance procedure revealed that there was a 
signigicant difference among the groups in the overall knowledge of Supreme 
Court decisions affecting education* further analysis was conducted using 
the Newman-Keuls procedure. Superintendents scored significantly higher 
than teachers and board members; principals scored significantly higher 
than teachers and board members. No significant difference was found 
between superintendents and principals or between board members and 
teachers in the overall knowledge demonstrated about United States Supreme 
Court decisions affecting education. Results of the Newman-Keuls 
procedure are presented in Table 18.
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Table IB
Means and Mean Differences Between Groups in Their
Overall Knowledge of Supreme Court
Decisions Affecting Education
Group Mean Differences
Group Group Means Board Member Principal Superintendent
Teacher 16.0118 0.0651 2.8939* 4.2383**
Board Member 16.0769 2.8288* 4.1731**
Principal 18.9057 1.3443
Superintendent 20.2500
♦Significant at .05 level 
**Signifleant at .01 level
There was a total of eighty-five public school teachers who returned 
a survey instrument. Thirteen respondents indicated that they had from 
one to five years of experience in education, twenty-three had from six 
to ten years experience, twenty-four had from eleven to fifteen years 
experience, seven had from sixteen to twenty years experience, and 
eighteen had twenty-one or more years of experience in education. Table 19 
presents the means and standard deviations for the five experience levels 
and for the entire teacher sample on the overall knowledge of Supreme 
Court decisions affecting education.
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Table 19
Moans and Standard Deviations Cor tho Overall Knowledge of Supreme
Court Decisions Affecting Education Demonstrated by Teachers
with Differing Levels of Experience in Education
Years of 
Experience N Mean
Standard
Deviation
1-5 13 16.5385 3.9710
6-10 23 16.6087 5.1499
11-15 24 17.0000 5.4133
16-20 7 14.4286 2.3705
21 + 18 14.1667 6.2521
Entire Teacher Sample 85 16.0118 5.1858
Null Hypothesis 7
Null Hypothesis 7 states that there will be no significant difference 
in the amount of knowledge about United States Supreme Court decisions 
affecting education demonstrated by public school teachers with one to 
five, six to ten, eleven to fifteen, sixteen to twenty, and twenty-one 
or more years of experience in education.
The results of the analysis of variance statistical procedure for 
Null Hypothesis 7 are presented in Table 20. The P ratio was 1.0636 
with the F probability being 0.3801 which was greater than the .05 
level of significance. Therefore, a significant difference was not found, 
and the null hypothesis was not rejected. No two groups were significantly 
different at the .05 level.
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Table 20
Analysis of Variance for the Overall Knowledge of Supreme Court
Decisions Affecting Education Demonstrated by Teachers
with Differing Levels of Experience in Education
Source of 
Variation
Degrees of 
Freedom
Sum of 
Squares
Mean
Squares
F
Ratio
F
Probability
Between Groups 4 114.0649 28.5162 1.0636 .3801
Within Groups 80 2144.9233 26.8115
Total 84 2258.9882
P >  .05
There was a total of fifty-throe public school principals who 
returned a completed survey instrument. Two respondents indicated that 
they had from one to five years of experience in education, two had 
from six to ten years experience, seven had from eleven to fifteen years 
experience, twelve had from sixteen to twenty years experience, and 
thirty had twenty-one or more years experience in education. Table 21 
presents the means and standard deviations for the five experience levels 
and for the entire principal sample on the overall knowledge of Supreme 
Court decisions affecting education.
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Table 21
Means and Standard Deviations for the Overall Knowledge of Supreme
Court Decisions Affecting Education Demonstrated by Principals
with Differing Levels of Experience in Education
Years of 
Experience N Mean
Standard
Deviation
1-5 2 24.0000 5.6559
6-10 2 18.5000 2.1213
11-15 7 17.5714 2.9358
16-20 12 17,8333 3.5119
21 + 30 19.3333 5.1282
Entire Principal Sample 53 18.9057 4.5373
Null Hypothesis B
Null Hypothesis 8 states that there will be no significant difference 
in the amount of knowledge about United States Supreme Court decisions 
affecting education demonstrated by public school principals with one to 
five, six to ten, eleven to fifteen, sixteen to twenty, and twenty-one or 
more years of experience in education*
The results of the analysis of variance statistical procedure for 
Null Hypothesis 8 are presented in Table 22. The F ratio was 1.0215 with 
the F probability being .4058 which was greater than the .05 level of 
significance. Therefore, a significant difference was not found, and the 
null hypothesis was not rejected. No two groups were significantly 
different at the .05 level*
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Table 22
Analysis of Variance for the Overall Knowledge of Supreme court
Decisions Affecting Education Demonstrated by Principals
with Differing Levels of Experience in Education
Source of 
Variation
Degrees of 
Freedom
Sum of 
Squares
Mean
Squares
F
Ratio
F
Probability
Between Groups 4 83.9807 20.9952 1.0215 .4058
Within Groups 48 986.5476 20.5531
Total 52 1070.5283
P >  .05
There was a total of sixty-four public school superintendents who 
returned a completed survey instrument. Twelve respondents indicated that 
they had from eleven to fifteen years of experience in education, seven 
had from sixteen to twenty years of experience, and forty-five had 
twenty-one or more years of experience in education. Hone of the 
respondents had ten years, or less, experience in education. Table 23 
presents the means and standard deviations for the five experience levels 
and for the entire superintendent sample on the overall knowledge of 
Supreme Court decisions affecting education.
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Table 23
Means and Standard Deviations for the Overall Knowledge of Supremo Court
Decisions Affecting education Demonstrated by Superintendents
with Differing Levels of Experience of Education
Years of 
Experience N Mean
Standard
Deviation
1-5 0
6-10 0
11-15 12 21.5000 4.2319
16-20 7 20.2657 6.5756
21 + 45 19.9111 5.4972
Entire Superintendent Sample 64 20.2500 5.3601
Hull Hypothesis 9
Hull Hypothesis 9 states that there will be no significant difference 
in the amount of knowledge about United States Supreme Court decisions 
affecting education demonstrated by public school superintendents with one 
to five, six to ten, eleven to fifteen, sixteen to twenty, and twenty-one 
or more years of experience in education.
The results of the analysis of variance statistical procedure for 
Mull Hypothesis 9 are presented in Table 24. The F ratio was 0.40S6 
with the F probability being .6664 which was greater than the .05 level 
of significance. Therefore, a significant difference was not foundf and 
the null hypothesis was not rejected. No two groups were significantly 
different at the .05 level.
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Table 24
Analysis of Variance for the Overall Knowledge of Supreme court Decisions
Affecting Education Demonstrated by Superintendents with
Differing Levels of Experience in Education
Source of 
Variation
Degrees of 
Freedom
Sum of 
Squares
Kean
Squares
F
Ratio
F
Probability
Between Groups 2 23.9270 11.9635 .4086 .6664
Within Groups 61 1786.0730 29.2799
Total 63 1810.0000
I* >  .05
There was a total of thirty-nine public school board members who 
returned a completed survey instrument. Twelve respondents indicated 
that they had from one to five years of experience in education, ten had 
from six to ten years of experience, seven had from eleven to fifteen 
years of experience, four had from sixteen to twenty years of experience, 
and six had twenty-one or more years of experience in education. Table 25 
presents the means and standard deviations for the five experience levels 
and for the entire school board sample on the overall knowledge of Supreme 
Court decisions affecting education.
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Table 25
Means and Standard Deviations for the Overall Knowledge of Supreme Court
Decisions Affecting Education Demonstrated by Board Members
with Differing Levels of Experience in Education
Years of 
Experience N Mean
Standard
Deviation
1-5 12 17.2500 6.1515
6-10 10 14.2000 6.1608
11-15 7 17.0000 4.3205
16-20 4 14.0000 5.3541
21 + 6 17.1667 4.9160
Entire Board Member Sample 39 16.0769 5.5221
Null Hypothesis 10
Null Hypothesis 10 states that there will be no significant difference 
in the amount of knowledge about United States Supreme Court decisions 
affecting education demonstrated by public school board members with one 
to five, six to ten, eleven to fifteen, sixteen to twenty, and twenty-one 
or more years of experience in education.
The results of the analysis of variance statistical procedure for 
Null Hypothesis 10 are presented in Table 26. The F ratio waB 0.6480 with 
the F probability being .6321 which was greater than the .05 level of 
significance. Therefore, a significant difference was not found, and the 
null hypothesis was not rejected. No two groups were significantly 
different at the .05 level.
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Table 26
Analysis of Variance for the Overall Knowledge of Supreme Court
Decisions Affecting Education Demonstrated by Board Members
with Differing Levels of Experience in Education
Source of 
Variation
Degrees of 
Freedom
Sum of 
Squares
Mean
Squares
F
Patio
F
Probability
Between Groups 4 82.0859 20.5215 .6480 .6321
Within Groups 34 1076.6833 31.6672
Total 38 1158.7692
P >.05
There was a total of eighty-five public school teachers who returned 
a completed survey instrument. One respondent indicated that he was a 
high school graduate, forty-one had the baccalaureate degree, twenty-one 
had a master's degree, eighteen had a master's degree plus additional 
course work, and four had the education specialist degree. None had 
received the doctorate degree. Table 27 presents the means and standard 
deviations for the six education levels and for the entire teacher sample.
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Table 27
Means and Standard Deviations for the Overall Knowledge of Supreme Court
Decisions Affecting Education Demonstrated by Teachers
with Differing Levels of Educational Attainment
Highest Level 
of Education N Mean
Standard
Deviation
High School Graduate 1 7.0000 0.0000
Baccalaureate Degree 41 14.9268 5.2839
Master's Degree 21 17.3810 4.8008
Master's Plus 18 16.8333 5.1933
Education Specialist Degree 4 18.5000 2.3805
Doctoral Degree 0
Entire Teacher Sample 85 16.0118 5.1858
Hull Hypothesis 11
Null Hypothesis 11 states that there will be no significant difference 
in the amount of knowledge about United States Supreme Court decisions 
affecting education demonstrated by public school teachers with a high 
school diploma, a baccalaureate degree, a Master's degree, a Master's 
degree plus additional coursework, an Education Specialist's degree, and 
a doctoral degree.
The results of the analysis of variance statistical procedure for Hull 
Hypothesis 11 are presented in Table 2B. The F ratio was 2.0042 with the 
F probability being .1018 which was greater than the .05 level of 
significance. Therefore, a significant difference was not found, and the
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null hypothesis was not rejected. Ho two groups were significantly
different at the .05 level.
Table 26
Analysis of Variance for the Overall Knowledge of Supreme Court 
Decisions Affecting Education Demonstrated by Teachers with 
Differing Levels of Educational Attainment
Source of 
Variance
Degrees of 
Freedom
Sum of Mean 
Squares Squares
F
Ratio
F
Probability
Between Groups 4 205.7554 51.4388 2.0042 .1018
Within Groups 80 2053.2329 25.6654
Total 84 2258.9BB2
PjS> .05
There was a total of fifty-three public school principals who 
returned a completed survey instrument. One respondent indicated that 
he had received a baccalaureate degree, nine had a master's degree, thirty 
had a master's degree plus additional coursework, nine had the education 
specialist degree, and four had received the doctoral degree. Table 29 
presents the means and standard deviations for the six education levels 
and for the entire principal sample.
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Table 29
Means and Standard Deviations for the Overall Knowledge of Supreme Court
Decisions Affecting Education Demonstrated by Principals
with Differing Levels of Educational Attainment
Highest Level 
of Education N Mean
Standard
Deviation
High School Graduate 0
Baccalaureate Degree 1 21.0000 0.0000
Master's Degree 9 20.7778 3.5277
Master's Plus 30 19.4333 3.9973
Education Specialist Degree 9 16.2222 6.4183
Doctoral Degree 4 16.2500 3.6856
Entire Principal Sanple 53 18.9057 4.5373
Mull Hypothesis 12
Null Hypothesis 12 states that there will be no significant difference 
in the amount of knowledge about United States Supreme Court decisions 
affecting education demonstrated by public school principals with a high 
school diploma, a baccalaureate degree, a Master's degree, a Master's 
degree plus additional coursework, an Education Specialist's degree, and 
a doctoral degree.
The results of the analysis of variance statistical procedure for Null 
Hypothesis 12 are presented in Table 30. The F ratio was 1.7655 with the 
F probability being .1513 which was greater than the .05 level of 
significance. Therefore, a significant difference was not found, and the
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null hypothesis was not rejected. No two groups were significantly
different at the .05 level.
Table 30
Analysis of Variance for the Overall Knowledge of Supreme Court 
Decisions Affecting Education Demonstrated by Principals 
with Differing Levels of Educational Attainment
Source of Degrees of Sum of Mean F F
Variation Freedom Squares Squares Ratio Probability
Between Groups 4 137.3005 34.3251 1.7655 .1513
Within Groups 48 933.2278 19.4422
Total 52 1070.5283
P 2k .05
There was a total of sixty-four public school superintendents who 
returned a completed survey instrument. Thirteen respondents indicated 
that they had attained a master's degree, twenty-five had a master's 
degree plus additional coursework, twelve had the education specialist 
degree, and fourteen had received the doctoral degree. Table 31 presents 
the means and standard deviations for the six education levels and for 
the entire superintendent sample.
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Table 31
Means and Standard Deviations for the Overall Knowledge of Supreme Court
Decisions Affecting Education Demonstrated by Superintendents
with Differing Levels of Educational Attainment
Highest Level 
of Education N Mean
Standard
Deviation
High School Graduate 0
Baccalaureate Degree 0
Master's Degree 13 16.4615 4.8065
Master's Plus 25 21.6400 3.1075
Education Specialist Degree 12 17.9167 7.0641
Doctoral Degree 14 23.2857 4.9835
Entire Superintendent Sample 64 20.2500 5.3601
Null Hypothesis 13
Null Hypothesis 13 states that there will be no significant difference 
in the amount of knowledge about United States Supreme Court decisions' 
affecting education demonstrated by public school superintendents with a 
high school diploma, a baccalaureate degree, a Master's degree, a Master's 
degree plus additional coursework, an Educational Specialist's degree, and 
a doctoral degree.
The results of the analysis of variance statistical procedure for 
Null Hypothesis 13 are presented in Table 32. The F ratio was 6.2174 
with the F probability being .0010 which was less than the .05 level of 
significance. Therefore, a significant difference was found, and the null 
hypothesis was rejected.
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Table 32
Analysis of Variance for the Overall Knowledge of Supreme Court Decisions
Affecting Education Demonstrated by Superintendents with
Differing Levels of Educational Attainment
Source of 
Variation
Degrees of 
Freedom
Sum of 
Squares
Mean
Squares
F
Ratio
F
Probability
Between Groups 3 429.2354 143.0785 6.2174 .0010*
Within Groups 60 1360.7646 23.0127
Total 63 1810.0000
*P ^  .05
Since the analysis of variance procedure revealed that there was a 
significant difference among superintendents with differing levels of 
educational attainment in their knowledge of Supreme Court decisions 
affecting education, further analysis was conducted using the Newman-Keuls 
procedure. This analysis indicated that superintendents with a Master's 
degree plus additional course work and superintendents with a doctoral 
degree scored significantly higher than superintendents with a Master's 
degree and superintendents with an Education Specialist's degree. Results 
of the Newman-Keuls procedure are presented in Table 33.
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Table 33
Means and Mean Differences Between Superintendents with Differing 
Levels of Educational Attainment in Their Knowledqe of 
Supreme Court Decisions Affecting Education
Highest Level Group Mean Differences
of Education Group Means Education
Specialist
Master's
Plus
Doctorate
Master’s Degree 16.4615 1.4552 5.1785* 6.8242**
Education Specialist 17.9167 3.7233* 5.3690**
Master's Plus 21.6400 1.6457
Doctoral Degree 23.2B57
♦Significant at .05 level
♦♦Significant at .01 level
There was a total of thirty-nine public school board members who 
returned a completed survey instrument. Sixteen respondents indicated 
that they were high school graduates, seventeen had received a 
baccalaureate degree, two had a master's degree, two had a master's degree 
plus additional course work, and two had received the doctoral degree. 
Table 34 presents the means and standard deviations for the six 
education levels and for the entire board member sample.
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Table 34
Means and Standard Deviations for the Overall Knowledge of Supreme Court
Decisions Affecting Education Demonstrated by Board Members
with Differing Levels of Educational Attainment
Highest Level 
of Education N Mean
Standard
Deviation
High School Graduate 16 15.6250 5.3650
Baccalaureate Degree 17 15.8235 6.1363
Master's Degree 2 18.0000 1.4142
Master's Plus 2 14.0000 5.6569
Education Specialist Degree 0
Doctoral Degree 2 22.0000 0.0000
Entire Board Member Sample 39 16.0769 5.5221
Hull Hypothesis 14
Hull Hypothesis 14 states that there will be no significant difference 
in the amount of knowledge about United States Supreme Court decisions 
affecting education demonstrated by public school board members with a 
high school diploma, a baccalaureate degree, a Master's degree, a Master's 
degree plus additional coursework, an Education Specialist's degree, and 
a doctoral degree.
The results of the analysis of variance statistical procedure for Null 
Hypothesis 14 are presented in Table 35. The F ratio was 0.7215 with the 
F probability being .5639 which was greater than the .05 level of 
significance. Therefore, a significant difference was not found, and the
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null hypothesis was not rejected. No two groups were significantly
different at the .05 level.
Table 35
Analysis of Variance for the Overall Knowledge of Supreme Court Decisions 
Affecting Education Demonstrated by Board Members with 
Differing Levels of Educational Attainment
Source of 
Variation
Degrees of 
Freedom
Sum of 
Squares
Mean F 
Squares Ratio
F
Probability
Between Groups 4 90.5486 22.6372 .7205 .5839
Within Groups 34 1068.2206 31.4183
Total 38 1158.7692
P >  .05
Summary
The purpose of this study was to determine the knowledge of United 
States Supreme Court decisions affecting education possessed by public 
school teachers, principals, superintendents, and board members. Fourteen 
null hypotheses were formulated and tested at the .05 level of statistical 
significance using the analysis of variance. The Newman-Keuls statistical 
procedure was conducted if significant differences were revealed. This 
latter procedure was performed to determine where significant differences 
lay. Data were analyzed for 241 respondents.
The first six hypotheses were formulated and tested to determine if 
significant differences existed among the four groups in terms of their 
knowledge of Supreme Court decisions affecting education. Five areas and
XS5
the total knowledge of Supreme Court decisions affecting education were 
identified and tested. Significant differences were found to exist among 
the four groups in all areas except in the area of race, language, and 
sex discrimination cases. Significant differences were found among the 
four groups in the overall knowledge of Supreme Court decisions affecting 
education. Therefore, null hypotheses 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 were rejected; 
null hypothesis 4 was not rejected.
Hypotheses 7, 8, 9, and 10 were formulated and tested to determine 
if significant differences existed in the knowledge of Supreme Court 
decisions among members of each group depending on their years of 
experience in education. No significant differences were found among the 
members of any of the four groups. The null hypotheses were not rejected.
Hypotheses 11, 12, 13, and 14 were formulated and tested to determine 
if significant differences existed in the knowledge of Supreme Court 
decisions among members of each group depending on their level of 
education. No significant differences were found among the members of the 
teacher, principal, and board member samples. Therefore, the null 
hypotheses 11, 12, and 14 were not rejected. Significant differences 
were found among superintendents with differing levels of educational 
attainment; null hypothesis 13 was rejected.
CHAPTER 5 
Summary and Recotnnendations
Summary
The primary purpose of this study was to determine the knowledge of 
United States Supreme Court decisions affecting education possessed by 
public school teachers, principals, superintendents, and board members. 
Survey instruments were mailed to two hundred teachers, one hundred 
principals, one hundred superintendents, and one hundred board members 
in the public school systems of Tennessee. A follow-up mailing was sent 
out four weeks after initial mailing. Eighty-five teachers, fifty-three 
principals, sixty-four superintendents, and thirty-nine board members 
returned usable instruments. This total of 241 responses represented 
48.2 percent of the sample.
Specifically, this study compared knowledge of Supreme Court decisions 
affecting education in three ways. First, six hypotheses wore formulated 
to determine if significant differences existed among public school 
teachers, principals, superintendents, and board members in their 
knowledge of Supreme Court decisions affecting education. Five of these 
hypotheses were concerned with specific areas of school governance. The 
Bixth hypothesis was concerned with the overall knowledge of Supreme 
Court decisions affecting education.
Second, four hypotheses were formulated to determine if significant 
differences existed in the knowledge of Supreme court decisions affecting
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education among members of each group* depending on respondents' years 
of experience in education. Third* four hypotheses were formulated to 
determine if significant differences existed in the knowledge of Supreme 
Court decisions affecting education among members of each group* dependent 
on respondents' level of education.
The fourteen null hypotheses were formulated to be tested at the 
.05 level of significance. The analysis of variance statistical procedure 
was used as the first step in data analysis. This procedure yielded an 
F ratio and an F probability which indicated whether a significant 
difference existed. If a significant difference was revealed* the Newman- 
Keuls procedure was used to determine where specific differences occurred.
Significant differences were revealed in six of the fourteen 
hypotheses tested. Thus* the null hypothesis was rejected for hypotheses 
1* 2, 3* 5* 6* and 13.
The mean score of 17.7842 for the entire sample on the thirty-five 
item instrument suggested a deficiency in the preservice and in-service 
training of individuals involved in education. Although significant 
differences were found among groups* mean scores for the four groups 
revealed a general lack of knowledge in the overall knowledge of Supreme 
Court decisions affecting education.
There was a significant difference among groups in the knowledge 
demonstrated about United States Supreme Court decisions affecting 
education in the area of student rights and responsibilities. 
Superintendents scored significantly higher than teachers and board 
members on this section of the survey instrument, and principals scored 
significantly higher than board members. No significant difference was
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found between superintendents and principals, between principals and 
teachers, or between teachers and board members in the amount of knowledge 
demonstrated about United States Supreme Court decisions affecting 
education in the area of student rights and responsibilities.
There was a significant difference among groups in the knowledge 
demonstrated about United States Supreme Court decisions affecting 
education in the area of employee rights and responsibilities. 
Superintendents and principals scored significantly higher than teachers 
on this section of the survey instrument. No significant difference was 
found between superintendents and principals, between superintendents 
and board members, between principals and board members, or between 
board members and teachers in the amount of knowledge demonstrated about 
United States Supreme Court decisions affecting education in the area of 
employee rights and responsibilities.
There was a significant difference among groups in the knowledge 
demonstrated about United States Supreme Court decisions affecting 
education in the area of church and state relationships. Superintendents 
scored significantly higher than teachers, principals, and board members 
on this section of the survey instrument. Principals scored 
significantly higher than teachers and board members. No significant 
difference was found between teachers and board members in the amount 
of knowledge demonstrated about United States Supreme Court decisions 
affecting education in the area of church and state relationships.
There was no significant difference among groups in the knowledge 
demonstrated about United States Supreme Court decisions affecting 
education in the area of race, language, and sex discrimination.
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There was a significant difference among groups in the knowledge 
demonstrated about United States Supreme Court decisions affecting 
education in the area of school district finance and organization. 
Superintendents and principals scored significantly higher than teachers 
on this section of the survey instrument. No significant difference was 
found between superintendents and principals, between superintendents 
and board members, between principals and board members, or between board 
members and teachers in the amount of knowledge demonstrated about United 
States Supreme Court decisions affecting education in the area of school 
district finance and organization.
There was a significant difference among groups in the overall 
knowledge demonstrated about United States Supreme Court decisions 
affecting education. Superintendents scored significantly higher than 
teachers and board members on the survey instrument. Principals scored 
significantly higher than teachers and board members. No significant 
difference was found between superintendents and principals or between 
board members and teachers in the overall knowledge demonstrated about 
United States Supreme Court decisions affecting education.
The number of years of experience in education did not significantly 
affect the amount of knowledge about United States Supreme Court decisions 
affecting education demonstrated by teachers.
The number of years of experience in education did not significantly 
affect the amount of knowledge about United States Supreme Court decisions 
affecting education demonstrated by principals.
The number of years of experience in education did not significantly 
affect the amount of knowledge about United States Supreme Court decisions
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affecting education demonstrated by superintendents.
The number of years of experience in education did not significantly 
affect the amount of knowledge about United States Supreme Court decisions 
affecting education demonstrated by board members*
The level of education attained did not significantly affect the 
amount of knowledge about United States Supreme Court decisions affecting 
education demonstrated by teachers.
The level of education attained did not significantly affect the 
amount of knowledge about United States Supreme Court decisions affecting 
education demonstrated by principals.
The level of education attained significantly affected the amount of 
knowledge about United States Supreme Court decisions affecting education 
demonstrated by superintendents* Superintendents with a Master's degree 
plus additional coursework and superintendents with a doctoral degree 
scored significantly higher than superintendents with a Master's degree 
and superintendents with an Education Specialist's degree.
The level of education attained did not significantly affect the 
amount of knowledge about United States Supreme Court decisions affecting 
education demonstrated by board members*
Recotimendatlons 
One may conclude from the results of this survey that the 
superintendents and principals surveyed possess more knowledge of 
United States Supreme Court decisions affecting education than do board 
members or teachers* Except in the area of race, language, and sex 
discrimination, superintendents scored significantly higher than teachers.
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Except in the areas of race, language, and Bex discrimination and 
student rights and responsibilities, principals scored significantly 
higher than teachers. Superintendents and principals scored significantly 
higher than board members in the areas of student rights and 
responsibilities, church and state relationships, and overall knowledge.
In four of the five sections of the survey, superintendents had the 
highest score, and principals had the second-highest score. The sole 
exception was the area of race, language, and sex discrimination, in 
which principals scored slightly higher than superintendents. For the 
entire survey, superintendents and principals scored significantly 
higher than teachers and board members. An analysis of the findings 
of this survey led to the conclusion that administrators are better 
equipped to make the decisions that comply with the laws affecting 
education. Thus, the responsibilities delegated to superintendents and 
principals seem to be rightly placed.
However, the low scores of all groups surveyed indicated a general 
lack of preparation in the area of school law. The fact that the mean 
score of the entire sample was 17.7842 on a thirty-five item test 
indicated a deficiency in thiB area.
As a result of the findings of this study, the following 
recoirenendations were proposed:
1. College and university teacher-education programs should be 
evaluated in terms of the preservice preparation of teachers in the area 
of school law, including Supreme Court decisions affecting education.
2. Graduate programs in educational administration should be 
evaluated in terms of their preparation of principals and superintendents
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in the area of school law, including Supreme Court decisions affecting
education.
3. State and national school board associations should evaluate 
their preparation of school board members in the area of school law, 
including Supreme Court decisions affecting education.
4. State and local school districts and school board associations 
should seek to provide appropriate in-service programs to keep their 
personnel informed of pertinent matters of school law, including 
Supreme Court decisions affecting education.
5. A study of this nature should be conducted in other states, 
in specific geographic regions, or in a nationwide study.
6. Because of the ever-changing nature of the law and of the 
Court's interpretation of the law, studies of this nature should be 
conducted periodically.
7. The present study examined education levels and levels of 
experience in education as factors in knowledge of Supreme Court 
decisions affecting education. Future studies of this type might 
consider other factors such as sex differences, regional differences, 
recency of course work in school law, or size of school district.
8. Future studies of this type might incorporate a different 
set of test items to measure knowledge of Supreme Court decisions 
affecting education. For example, other studies might include questions 
pertaining solely to higher education.
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LETTER FROM PERRY A. ZIRKEL
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524 Brodhcad Avenue, Bethlehem, Pennsylvania 18015 (215) 861*3221
L e h ig h  U n iv e r sit y
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SCHOOL OF EDUCATION 
Office of the D e a n July 14, 1982
William P. Abegglen 
2403 Hufflne Circle 
Johnson City, TN 37601
Dear Mr. Abegglen:
You hereby have my permission to use my C0URTS-SCH00LS Instrument or 
an abbreviated version thereof for your dissertation study with the under­
standing that the source will be appropriately acknowledged and that you 
send me a courtesy copy of your abstract upon completing the study.
Citations of articles in which 1 used this Instrument or a similar 
technique are:
Zirkel, P. "Test on Supreme Court decisions affecting education. Phi Delta 
Kappan. 1978, 59, 521-2.
Zirkel, P. A quiz on recent court decisions concerning student conduct. Phi
Delta Kappan. 1980, 6 2 , 206-208.
Zirkel, P. 6 Metzger, M. Special education: A quick quiz to keep up-to-date.
School Administrator, 1981, 30 (9), 20-21.
Zirkel, P. Test your legal savvy. Instructor, 1982, 91 (7), 54-55, 129.
Zirkel, P. Outcomes analysis of court decisions concerning faculty employment. 
NOLPE School Law Journal. 10 (2), 171-183.
I do not have any printed copies of the instrument left, but it Is largely
contained in NOLPE School Law Journal, 1978, 7_t 199-208. Also, the book
summarizing the decisions Is A Digest of Supreme Court Decisions Affecting 
Education. Bloomington, Indiana: Phi Delta Kappa, 1978 (and 1982 Supplement).
Sincerely,
Zirkel
Dean and Professor
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S U P R E M E  CO URT D E C IS IO N S  IM PA C TIN G  ON EDUCATION
INSTRUCTIONS: Please pUce jn * on one al Ihe lull three lines tie lew la indicate whether IM United Stilts Supreme Coutl has held the 
practice ot procedure described la be mandatory ("MUSI"), permissible ("MAY"), or prohibited {'‘MUST HOT") Use 11m fourth line il 
you dan i know whal ihe Court lus ruled
STUDENT RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES
1. School olkiils be granted immunily Irom liability lor damages when they can show they lure used nonmabcioui and
“good lailh" actions to luilili their oilicial duties.
Musi_____ May____ _ Musi nai Don‘1 know______
2. School otlictais_____ gram the same doe process procedure lo juveniles as would be given to adults.
Musi_____ May_____ Muiinni....Don't know________
3. School otlicials_____ require siudenis to participate In daily Hag salute exercises.
Musi May Must not______ Don'i_know______
4. School ollictais_____ allow pupils lo wear armbands, picket peacelully, distribute publications, or otherwise express their
beliefs when such means ol expression do not disrupt or Interfere wilh school aclMlles.
Musi_____ May_____ Musi not______ Don't_know______
5. School ollidais______ provide oral or written notice and an Informal hearing prior lo suspensions lor periods Ol up lo ten days
lor siudenis whose presence does nol pose an immediate threat lo persons, properly, or the academic process.
Mull May Musi nnl Don‘1 krww
6. School ollidais______ use reasonable corporal punishment oI siudenis under ihe authorization ol or In the absence ol state law
regarding Ihe use ol corporal punishment.
Musi May Musi nol______ Oon'l_know______
7. A school district_____ require, under authorization ol a state sialule or under compulsion ol local ordinance, vaccination as a
condition ol school attendance.
Musi May Musi nol______ Don't_know______
EMPLOYEE RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES
S. A school dis Kiel_____ require teachers or other school employees lo lake a broad loyalty oalh as a requisite ot employment.
Mmi May Mustnol______ Don'iknow_______
9. A school distrid______dismiss a teacher lor refusing to answer questions which are unrelated loan inquiry into the teacher's
Illness to teach.
Musi May Must nol______ Don’t know______
10. A school district impost a rule establishing contract norvenewal as the sanction lor (allure to comply wilh a continuing
education requirement.
Must May Must nol______Don't know______
11. A school dislrict______ dismiss a teacher lor openly criticizing ihe school board's or administration's poifdts on Issues ol
public importance when ihe board cannot prove knowing or reckless lalslty ol the teacher's statement.
Must May Mustnol______Don't know______
12. A school district require its employees lo reside In Ihe school dislrtcl as a condition ol Initial or continued employment.
Must_____ May_____Must nol_______Don't know-------
13. A state______ allow its school dislricts to have contractual arrangements lor nonprolesslonal slat! members that are not In con*
lormily with the minimum-satary, maximum-hour provisions ol the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act,
Musi_____ May_____Musi nol_______ Oon'l know______
14. A school district______dismiss I esc hers who are engaged in an illegal strike when ihe teachers do nol show that Ihe board's
decision was based on personal, pecuniary, or antiunion bias.
Musi May_____Must nol_______ Oon'l know______
15. A stale______allow Hs school districts to enter into a edlecUve bargaining agreement that has an "agency shop" provision
(i.e.. a requirement lhal nonunion employees pay a service lea lor expenses relating lo the union's collective bargaining function). 
Musi May Musi nol______Don’t know______
174
CHURCH AND STATE RELATIONSHIPS
16 School officials Allow on exemption Iron compulsory high school altendance lor students atlilialed wilh religious setts
inn luvt a long history ol inlormai vocational training during ihe Adolescent years
Musi May Musi nol______Don'I know______
17 A school dislnct______provide lor comparable services to parochial school pupils In its plan lor spending federal Cnauier I
(formerly "line I") funds.
Must_____  May Mustnol Don't know______
18. School officials   allow lot "released time" lor religious inslrucuon ot pupils during school hours outside the school
building.
Must_____May Mustnol______ Oon'l know______
19. A state______ provide for the lending ol approved secular leilbooks free-of-charge lo nonpubkc school children.
Musi  May_____ Must nol  Oon'l know
20 A stale______ provide foe reimbursement ol bus transportation costs lo parents ol children attending parochial schools.
Musi_____May_____ Musi not_______Oon'l know______
21. A school disiricf______ hive a program requiring Ihe daily reclUUon of a nondenomlnatianal prayer in school under the super­
vision ol school personnel
Must_____May_____ Must not_______Oon'l know______
22. A school district______require the regular reading ol Biblical passages under the supervision ol school personnel.
Musi_____May Muit nol_______Don't know______
RACE, LANGUAGE, AND SEX DISCRIMINATION
23. A school district______ operate single-sea schools when such a school Is voluntary, when coeducational alternatives are
available, and when educabonal opportunities ollered at Ihe schools for males and females are comparable.
Musi May Musi not______ Don't know______
21. Private, nonseetarian schools______otter admission lo qualllied Applicants solely on Ihe basis ol race.
Must_ May Muit not Oon'l know
25. A school district______ implement a plan lor desegregation In which a student may voluntarily transfer tram a school where
he/she is In ihe racial mmonly to a school ol his/her own racial composition.
Must May Must not Oon'l know
26. A school district's desegregation proposal ..._ include implementation ol mathematical ratios lor Ihe desegregaiton ol 
studenls and faculty.
Musi May Musi not______ Don’t know______
27. A school dinners desegregation proposal______include a provision lor Ihe busing ol students to a school which is not the
closest school to the siudenis' homes.
Must_____May_____ Must not_______ Oon'l know______
2B, A school district______ grant tu credits or other stale linanciat assistance (e.g., tree textbooks, tullion grants) lo students ol
racially segregated private schools.
Must May Musi nol_______Don’t know______
29. A school district______have mandatory maternity leave rules itul require expectant teachers to lake a leave ol absence Irom a
specilied time before to a specified lime after Ihe expected date ol binh.
Must_____May_____ Musi nor Don’t know______
3G A school dislrici_„_____provide special language-based Instruction lor limited English-speaking pupils.
Must_____May______ Mustnol_______Don’t know______
SCHOOL DISTRICT FINANCE AND ORGANIZATION
3t A stale   .. limit the way in which lederal grams ol land may be usid when given to Ihe state for the purpose ol suppor ling
educaiion (e.g., requiring that such assets ml be spent and thai only earned Interest be expended lor the required purposei
Must May Musi not______  Don't know______
32 A school dislrici______ have a funding system that relies largely on the local properly lax when that school district otters at
lust a minimum education lo al pupils without discriminating against any rocognited disadvantaged group ol them
Must____  May Must nol_______Oon'l know______
33 A school d strict. limit Ihe right lo vote in school board elections to residents who either own taxable real property at na»e
children who are siudenis In the schooTdistricl.
Musr May Must nut Oon’l know______
34. A school dislrici______have a requirement lhal members ol Ihe board ol education be landowners.
Must May Mustnol_______Don't know______
35 A school drsiriet______have a statutory procedure which requires ratilieation by sixty percent rather than by a simple majority
of the votes in a referendum election lor bona issue approval or addilfonal taxation.
Must May Must not_______Don’t know------
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PERSONAL DATA
A. Position 1n which you serve: 
Teacher
Principal _ _ _ ________ „
Superintendent ____________
Board Member __________
B. Sex:
M ale________
Female______
C. Years o f experience In education:
1 - 5 _______
6 - 1 0  _
11 - 15 _______
16 - 20 _______
21 + _______
D. Highest level o f  formal education:
High school graduate ____________
Baccalaureate degree ____________
Master's d egree_______ _ _________
Master's plus ___________________
Education S p e c ia l i s t ^ __________
Doctorate _______________________
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East Tennessee Slate University
D e p artm en ta l Supervision and Adm inistration •  Bov 19000 A •  Johnson City, Tennessee 37614*0002 •  (615)929*4415,4430
William P. Abegglen 
Department of Supervision 
and Administration 
East Tennessee State University 
Box 19,OOOA
Johnson City, Tennessee 37614 
Dear Colleaguet
1 am a doctoral candidate in the Department of Supervision and 
Administration at East Tennessee State University. My dissertation is 
entitled "A Survey to Determine Knowledge of United States Supreme Court 
Decisions Affecting Education Possessed by Public School Teachers, 
Administrators, and Board Members."
This study will attempt to determine the knowledge of United States 
Supreme Court decisions affecting education possessed by public school 
teachers, administrators, and board members; to determine if significant 
differences exist among respondents when classified accordinq to number 
of years experience in education and level of education.
The successful completion of this study depends on your willingness 
to respond to the enclosed survey instrument. Your assistance will be 
deeply appreciated. Will you take a few minutes of your busy day to com­
plete the enclosed form and return it in the enclosed stamped evelope.
Responses will be reported by group totals only. You can be assured 
that the information you provide will be kept strictly confidential and 
that no individual will be identified in any way in this study. You will 
notice a code number on the enclosed instrument. This code number will 
be used only to facilitate follow-up techniques and will not be used to 
identify respondents.
Please return the completed instrument at your earliest convenience. 
Allow me to thank you in advance for your assistance in conducting this, 
study.
November 26, 1984
Sincerely yours,
William P. Abegglen 
Doctoral Candidate
WPAtchc College of Education
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East Tennessee State University
D epartm ent of Superviiton and  A dm lnlilratlon •  Bon 19000A •  lohnson City, T en n e n ee  37614-0002 •  (615)929-4415,4430
January 4, 19B5
William P. Abegglen 
Department of Supervision 
and Administration 
East Tennessee State University 
Box 19,000A
Johnson City, Tennessee 37614 
Dear Colleague;
Several weeks ago 1 mailed you a letter asking that you assist me in 
my doctoral studies at East Tennessee State University by completing a 
survey instrument. This survey instrument was designed to determine the 
knowledge of United States Supreme Court decisions affecting education 
possessed by public school teachers, principals, superintendents, and 
board members. Perhaps my original correspondence did not reach you or 
you were unable to complete the instrument earlier.
If for some reason you have not completed and returned the survey 
instrument I would appreciate it very much if you would take a few minutes 
to complete the enclosed form and return it in the enclosed stamped 
envelope.
Response will be reported by group totals only. You can be assured 
that the information you provide will be kept strictly confidential and 
that no individual will be identified in any way in the study.
Thank you very much for your assistance in conducting this study.
Sincerely yours,
William P. Abegglen 
Doctoral Candidate
WPA:chc
College of Education
VITA
Personal Data:
Bducation:
Professional 
Experience:
WILLIAM PAUL ABEGGLEN
Date of Birth: March 12, 1946
Place of Birth: Olney, Illinois
Marital Status: Married to Sue Richardson Abegglen
Public Schools, Olney, Illinois.
Lincoln Christian College, Lincoln, Illinois;
ministerial science, B.A., 1968.
Eastern Illinois University, Charleston, Illinois;
counseling and guidance, M.S. in Bducation, 1974. 
Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana;
counseling and quidance.
East Tennessee State University, Johnson City,
Tennessee; educational administration, Bd.D., 1985.
Teacher and coach. Helmsburg Elementary School, 
Brown County, Indiana, 1974-77.
Teacher, quidance counselor, and coach, Washington 
College Academy, Washington College, Tennessee, 
1978-80.
Doctoral Fellow, East Tennessee State University, 
Johnson City, Tennessee, 1980-82.
Principal and teacher, Keokuk Christian Academy, 
Keokuk, Iowa, 1982-present.
180
